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Abstract 
This report presents the collective work of the European Working Group on Land-Use 
Planning and discusses the activities towards more consistent land-use planning 
decisions through more understandable risk assessment approaches and data. The 
purpose of this book is to assist the EU Member States, especially those which do not 
have a consolidated system of approach, scenarios and criteria to assess the Land-Use 
Planning cases, in complying with the requirements of the Seveso Directive. 
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Glossary 
Note:  This glossary contains common terminology for describing aspects of chemical 
accident scenarios that may be useful to practitioners.  Not all of these terms are present 
in the Handbook. 
Atmospheric storage: Storage tanks maintained at ambient temperature and pressure 
and containing a substance in a liquid state. 
 
Atmospheric transport equipment: Transport equipment maintained at ambient 
temperature and pressure and containing a substance in a liquid state. 
 
BLEVE and possible fireball: The term BLEVE is an acronym for Boiling Liquid 
Expanding Vapour Explosion).  The BLEVE is one type of phenomena that may result 
from a catastrophic rupture. A BLEVE may occur when a vessel, containing a liquid highly 
superheated above its normal atmospheric boiling point, fails catastrophically. The risk of 
a BLEVE is typically associated with pressurized liquefied gas storage or pressurized 
liquids. The first consequence of a BLEVE is a blast effect due to vapour expansion when 
the vessel fails and to the explosive vapourization of the vessel liquid content. This effect 
is generally followed by missiles ejection.  If the substance is flammable, the air-
substance aerosol can ignite immediately. The flame front rapidly moves away from the 
ignition point, generating a fireball. Its temperature is extremely high and it causes an 
important thermal radiation.   
 
Boilover and resulting pool fire: Typically associated with a tank fire, the boilover 
phenomenon is the sudden and violent eruption of burning liquid out of an atmospheric 
storage on fire. This is the consequence of vapourization of liquid water in the bottom of 
the tank. An atmospheric storage can lead to a boilover if the following requirements are 
met: 
• Presence of water in the bottom of the tank 
• The formation of a heat wave which meets the water layer under the 
hydrocarbons mass 
• A sufficiently viscous hydrocarbon so that the water vapour cannot easily go 
through it from the tank bottom 
• An average boiling temperature higher than the one of the water at the pressure 
of interface water/hydrocarbon. The condition is the following for the usual 
hydrocarbon storage TBUL HC> 393K (120°C) 
• A range of boiling temperatures large enough to generate a heat wave, that is to 
say, 60° beyond the boiling temperature of the water at the pressure of interface. 
 
Bow-tie method.  The bow-tie is a risk assessment method used to identify critical 
events, build accident scenarios, and study the effectiveness and influence of safety 
barriers. 
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Bow-tie Terminology: 
• Critical event (CE) (in the bow-tie): This term is commonly defined as the 
event causing a loss of containment (LOC). This definition is quite accurate for 
fluids, as they usually behave dangerously after release. For solids and more 
especially for mass solid storage, the term “loss of physical integrity” (LPI) is 
considered more appropriate, as the critical event in this case is the change of 
chemical and/or physical state of the substance. The critical event is the centre of 
the bow-tie 
• Dangerous phenomenon (DP) (right side): This is an event following the 
tertiary critical event (for example, the pool fire after the ignition of a pool). 
Examples of dangerous phenomena are a vapour cloud explosion, a flash fire, etc. 
• Dangerous phenomenon with a "limited source term": In this case, the 
consequences of the dangerous phenomenon are limited by a successful safety 
barrier at the source (for example, by limiting the size of the pool or the release 
duration) 
• Dangerous phenomenon with "limited effects": Effects of the dangerous 
phenomenon are mitigated by a successful barrier in the event tree (for example, 
a water curtain acts to limit formation of gas clouds) 
• Dangerous phenomenon "fully developed": Dangerous phenomenon whose 
effects are not limited by preventive or mitigating measures 
• Detailed direct causes (DDC) (left side): The detailed direct cause is the 
event or collection of events that led to the direct cause 
• Direct causes (DC) (left side): The immediate causes of the necessary and 
sufficient causes (NSCs). For a given NSC, the list of direct causes tends to be the 
most complete possible 
• Event tree: Right part of the bow-tie, identifying the possible consequences of 
the critical event 
• Fault tree: Left part of the bow-tie, identifying the possible causes of the critical 
event 
• Initiating event (IE): the first causes upstream of each branch leading to the 
critical event in the fault tree (on the left end of the bowtie) 
• Major events - right side: Significant effects caused by the dangerous 
phenomena on vulnerable objects (human beings, structure, environment, …) 
• Necessary and sufficient causes (NSC)– left side: A term referring to the 
immediate causes that can provoke a critical event. For a given critical event, the 
list of NSCs is supposed to be exhaustive, which means that at least one of the 
NSCs must be fulfilled so that the critical event can occur. 
• Secondary critical event (SCE) – right-side: An event following the critical 
event (for example, the formation of a pool after a breach on a vessel) 
• Tertiary critical event (TCE) – right side: An event following the secondary 
critical event (for example, the ignition of a pool after the formation of a pool). 
• Undesirable event (UE): An undesirable event is any predictable deviation in a 
process or a system and is normally the first event on the left-side of the bow tie. 
The UE are, most of the time, generic events associated with organisational or 
human behaviour, that are ultimately considered as a cause of the critical event. 
 
Breach on the shell in liquid phase: This critical event is a hole with a given diameter 
on the shell of equipment containing a substance in liquid phase (below the surface of 
the liquid), leading to a continuous release.  
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This hole can be due to a mechanical stress from external or internal causes causing a 
deterioration of mechanical properties of the structure. 
 
Breach on the shell in vapour phase: This critical event is a hole with a given 
diameter on the shell of the equipment containing a substance in vapour phase (above 
the surface of the liquid if a liquid phase is present) leading to a continuous release. This 
hole can be due to a mechanical stress from external or internal causes causing a 
deterioration of mechanical properties of the structure.  This event also includes a breach 
on equipment where a solid material is suspended in air or in gas. 
 
Catastrophic rupture: A catastrophic rupture is the complete failure of the equipment 
leading to the complete and instantaneous release of the substance. A BLEVE is also a 
catastrophic rupture in particular operating conditions. Depending on the circumstances, 
the catastrophic rupture can lead to overpressure generation and missiles ejection. 
 
Collapse of the roof: The collapse of the roof may be due to a decrease of the internal 
pressure in the vessel, leading to the collapse of the mobile roof under the effect of 
atmospheric pressure. The collapse of the roof is especially associated with atmospheric 
storage. 
 
Cryogenic storage (with cooling system): This term refers to storage tanks 
maintained at atmospheric pressure or at a lower pressure and at a low temperature. 
The substance stored is a refrigerated liquefied gas. 
 
Dangerous (or hazardous) substance: The Seveso Directive defines a hazardous 
substance as a dangerous substance’ means a substance or mixture covered by Part 1 or 
listed in Part 2 of Annex I, including in the form of a raw material, product, by- product, 
residue or intermediate.  The classification of hazardous substances in the Directive is 
derived from the EU CLP-Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008. 
 
Decomposition: This critical event concerns only solid substances. It corresponds to a 
change of chemical state of the substance (loss of physical integrity) by action of an 
energy/heat source or by reaction with a chemical substance (incompatible reagent). 
The decomposition of the substance leads, as secondary and tertiary critical events, to 
an emission of toxic products or to a delayed explosion following formation of flammable 
gas. This critical event concerns only mass solid storage. 
 
Dust explosion: It can happen if a high enough dust concentration exists in an 
oxidising atmosphere. The reaction of combustion happens at the interface gas/solid and 
the intensity of the explosion depends directly on the area of reaction, that is to say the 
particle size. They can principally cause overpressure effects and missiles projection. 
 
Effectiveness of a safety barrier: The effectiveness is the ability for a technical safety 
barrier to perform a safety function for the duration of an undesired event, in a non-
degraded mode, for a pre-specified set of circumstances. The effectiveness is either a 
percentage or a probability of that the defined safety function will perform as intended. 
If the effectiveness is expressed as a percentage, it may vary during the operating time 
of the safety barrier. For example, a valve that does not completely close on demand 
would not have an effectiveness of 100%. 
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Environmental damage: This dangerous phenomenon results from dispersion of a 
substance identified as dangerous to the environment in sufficient consequences to 
effect the natural environment. It can also result from an emission of toxic vapours from 
the combustion of certain substances. 
 
Explosion: This critical event is only associated with solid substances classified as 
explosives. It corresponds to a change of physical state of the substance (LPI) by action 
of a energy/heat source or by action of a chemical source (incompatible reagent). This 
change of state implies combustion of a solid with overpressure generation (or an 
explosion) due to a violent and spontaneous reaction. In case of a substance stored in a 
closed vessel, an explosion (or an explosive decomposition of solid) is considered as an 
internal cause of overpressure leading to a loss of containment (for example, 
catastrophic rupture or breach on the shell).  
 
Fire: The fire is a process of combustion characterized by heat or smoke or flame or any 
combination of these three. 
 
Jet fire: The handling of pressurised flammable liquid or gas can lead to a jet fire in 
case of a leak on a pipe or on a vessel. The fluid ignition lead to form a jet flame 
characterised by a high radiant energy (largely higher than pool fire radiation) and by a 
noticeable kinetic energy. 
 
Leak from gas pipe: This critical event is a hole with a diameter corresponding to a 
given percentage of the nominal diameter of the pipe. It can also be a leak from a 
functional opening on the pipe: flanged joints, pump seals, valves, plugs, seals, … This 
leak occurs on a pipe carrying a gaseous substance. This critical event includes also a 
leak on equipment where a solid material is in suspension in air or in gas. 
 
Leak from liquid pipe: This critical event is a hole with a diameter corresponding to a 
given percentage of the nominal diameter of the pipe. It can also be a leak from a 
functional opening on the pipe: flanged joints, pump seals, valves, plugs, seals, … This 
leak occurs on a pipe carrying a liquid substance. 
 
Level of confidence of a safety barrier: The probability of failure on demand to 
perform properly a required safety function according to a given effectiveness and 
response time under all the stated conditions within a stated period of time. This notion 
is similar to the notion of SIL (Safety Integrity Level) defined in IEC 61511 for Safety 
Instrumented Systems but applies here to all types of safety barriers.  The "design" level 
of confidence is assessed with the help of instruction given in Appendix 8 of the IEC 
standard. The barrier is assumed to be maintained so that it is as efficient as when it 
was installed, to have the same response time and the same level of confidence or 
probability of failure on demand. 
 
The "operational" level of confidence includes the influence of the safety management 
system. The value could be lower than the "design" one if some problems are identified 
during the audit of the safety management system. 
 
(Un)loading unit: unit used for inlet and outlet of substances in the establishment, 
involving transport equipment. 
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Mass solid storage: storage of solid substances in the form of powder or pellets: 
These substances may be stored in bulk or in silos (solid products storage in form of 
"small" bags are not taken into account here). 
 
Material set in motion (entrainment by air): This critical event is reserved for a 
potentially mobile solid, to a fragmented solid (powder, dust, ,..) exposed to the 
ambience (e.g., fragmented solid in an open storage or in conveyor belts) and occurs 
due to the presence of an air vector (e.g., too high ventilation, …) 
 
Material set in motion (entrainment by a liquid): This critical event is reserved for a 
potentially mobile solid exposed to the ambience (e.g., fragmented solid in an open 
storage or in conveyor belts) and occurs due to the presence of a liquid vector (e.g. 
flooding, liquid escaping from other equipment, …)  
 
MIMAH: Methodology for the Identification of Major Accident Hazards 
 
MIRAS: Methodology for the Identification of Reference Accident Scenarios 
 
Missiles ejection: Various equipment items can be concerned by an explosion or by a 
pressure increase causing their burst with missile(s) ejection: 
• The BLEVE of a pressure vessel can generate missiles. 
• Explosive phenomena can occur in process equipment and cause the projection of 
fragments, for instance, a run-away in a reactor. 
• Atmospheric or cryogenic storage tanks can also produce missiles (tank 
explosion). It can mainly occur in the case of an accumulation of flammable 
vapours under the tank roof. 
• Mechanical bursting of pressure storage due, for example, to a increase of the 
pressure in the tank. 
 
Overpressure generation: A rapidly propagating pressure or shock-wave in 
atmosphere with high pressure, high density and high velocity. 
 
Padded storage: Storage tanks working at ambient temperature and at a pressure 
above 1 bar (the pressure is exerted by a pad of inert gas) and containing a substance in 
a liquid state. 
 
Pipe network (pipe): Piping linking different units of the plant is considered as "pipe 
network (pipes)" (for example, a pipe linking an unloading unit and a storage unit, or 
linking a storage unit and a process unit), as well as pipes feeding the flare. Piping 
staying inside a unit (for example, inside a storage farm, or between two process 
equipment of the same process unit) is not considered as "pipe". They are integral part 
of the equipment to which they are linked. 
 
Poolfire: The combustion of material evaporating from a layer of liquid (a pool). The 
occurrence of the layer of liquid results from the failure of equipment containing a 
flammable liquid. 
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Pressure storage: Storage tanks working at ambient temperature and at a pressure 
above 1 bar (pressure exerted by the substance, eventually with an inert gas). The 
substance stored can be a liquefied gas under pressure (two phase equilibrium) or a gas 
under pressure (one phase). 
 
Pressure transport equipment: Transport equipment working at ambient temperature 
and at a pressure above 1 bar (pressure exerted by the substance, eventually with an 
inert gas). The substance stored can be a liquefied gas under pressure (two phase 
equilibrium) or a gas under pressure (one phase). 
 
Process unit: unit used for the processing of substances or for the production of energy 
used in the establishment. In the process unit, equipment generally belongs to one or 
more general categories, as indicated below. For each category of equipment, examples 
are given but they do not constitute an exhaustive list. 
• Intermediate storage equipment integrated into the process, e.g., mass solid 
storage, pressure storage, padded storage, atmospheric storage, cryogenic 
storage 
• Equipment involving chemical reactions, e.g., reactor 
• Equipment devoted to the physical or chemical separation of substances, e.g., 
distillation column, absorption column, centrifuge, separators, dryers, sieves, 
classifiers 
• Equipment designed for energy production and supply, e.g., furnaces, boilers, 
direct-fired heat exchangers 
• Packaging equipment, equipment dedicated to the packaging of material. 
Packages are not included here, but only the packaging system 
• Other facilities, e.g., pumps, heat exchangers, compressors, gas expansion 
facility, piping internal to the process unit, mixers; blenders, etc. … 
 
Rain-out: Release of small liquid drops from the fraction of the flashing liquid that 
remains initially suspended in the atmosphere. 
 
Relevant hazardous equipment: Equipment containing a quantity of hazardous 
substance higher or equal to a threshold–quantity. 
 
Response time: Time elapsed from the moment a demand is imposed on the safety 
barrier and its complete achievement.  The response time is measure of the 
effectiveness of the safety function performed by the safety barrier. 
 
Safety barrier: A safety barrier is a physical, engineered system or human action (e.g., 
specific procedures, administrative controls) planned in advance to prevent, control, or 
mitigate undesired events or accidents.  They can avert the progression of a potential 
accident scenario or alter the outcome so that effects are less severe.  The safety barrier 
directly serves the safety function.  
 
Safety function: A safety function is the specific action performed by the safety barrier 
(e.g., close the valve, stop the process, etc.). 
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Start of fire (LPI): This critical event corresponds to the specific reaction between an 
oxidizing substance and a flammable or combustible substance, or to the autonomous 
decomposition of organic peroxide leading to a fire. This critical event concerns only 
substances that may cause fire (organic peroxides) or that may cause fire when in 
contact with combustible materials.  This event can also be associated with pyrotechnic 
substances. 
 
Storage unit: Unit used for the storage of raw materials, intermediate goods, 
manufactured products, or waste products. 
 
Storage of solids in small packages: Low capacity storage of solids in bags and in 
storage tanks with individual volume smaller than 1 m³. 
 
Storage of fluid in small packages: Low capacity storage of fluids in carboys or drums 
and all storage tanks with individual volume smaller than 1 m³. 
 
Tank fire: The tank fire is generally the consequence of the ignition of the gaseous 
phase in a vessel containing a flammable liquid. 
 
Toxic cloud: Mixing and spreading of toxic gases in air, which causes clouds to grow. 
The mixing is the result of turbulent energy exchange that is a function of a particular 
wind and atmospheric temperature profile. 
 
Unit: One or more grouped operations in an industrial establishment that can be defined 
and separated from others, e.g., storage units, (Un)loading Units, pipes networks, 
process units 
 
Vapour cloud explosion and flash fire: When a leakage occurs on an equipment item, a 
gaseous release can occur, either directly, or following the gradual vaporization of a pool on 
the ground close to the leakage. This event leads to the formation of a cloud that drifts and 
disperses with the wind. If the substance is flammable, there is an intermediate zone in which 
the vapour concentrations in the air are between the flammability limits of the substance. A 
sufficiently energetic ignition source, on the trajectory of the flammable zone of the cloud, 
may ignite this cloud. According to the front flame speed, the accident will lead to a flash fire 
or a VCE (vapour cloud explosion). The latter event causes an overpressure – underpressure 
wave. A devastating effect is associated with the peak overpressure as well as with the wave 
shape. 
 
Vessel collapse: A vessel collapse is the complete failure of the equipment, due to a 
decrease of the internal pressure in the vessel leading to the collapse of the vessel under the 
effect of atmospheric pressure.  This event leads to the complete and instantaneous release 
of the substance in the vessel. The vessel collapse does not lead to overpressure generation 
nor missiles ejection. 
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Executive Summary  
It is evident from past accidents in Europe and elsewhere that the consequences of 
industrial accidents can be severely aggravated because of the proximity of hazardous 
establishments to residential areas, transport hubs, commercial centres, public spaces 
and services.  The devastating fireworks accident in the Dutch town of Enschede killed 
22 people, injured over 900 and destroyed a significant part of the built environment of 
this town.  A little over a year later, the explosion of an ammonium nitrate storage 
facility in Toulouse, France caused over 30 deaths, 10,000 injuries as well as significant 
property damage and psychological trauma to the surrounding population due to its 
close proximity to dense urban areas.   
With the aim of reducing the impacts from major chemical accidents, a legal requirement 
was introduced into the Seveso Directive in 1996 to encourage the establishment of 
appropriate safety distances between these areas and Seveso sites. The Directive does 
not provide detailed suggestions on how EU Member States should implement this 
requirement into their land-use planning policies.  This approach reflects a conscientious 
application of the EU subsidiarity principle such that the Directive recognises that land-
use planning is guided by historic and social values unique to each country.   
As a result, methods and criteria for applied to fulfill Seveso land-use planning 
obligations in the different Member States are quite diverse, even though they all aim to 
achieve the same objective, that is, to evaluate the potential consequences of possible 
major accidents for use in making land-use planning decisions. In particular, each 
country has established its own process for evaluating the risk associated with specific 
chemical accident hazards.  Each applies a variation of the standard risk assessment 
approaches to incorporate the estimated risk into land-use planning decisions (see 
Annex 1).  Part of the process also includes, for some or all sites, depending on the 
country, an estimate of the risk associated with the hazardous site based on the analysis 
of consequences associated with a specific accident scenario or scenarios.  Scenarios are 
selected based on information in the safety reports and site notifications.  Calculation of 
risk estimates may be based on the data provided by the site or may be the regulator’s 
own standardized datasets.   
Given the numerous possible inputs and the diversity of risk assessment and land-use 
protocols, the outcome of the land-use planning process for the same type of site can 
differ considerably from one country to the next.  Much of this variation is difficult to 
avoid.  It has long been acknowledged that risk methods and land-use planning 
processes are embedded in local culture and pre-existing legal systems.  However, 
technical aspects associated with the consequence analysis, in particular, selection of 
scenarios and scenario attributes, are not subject to this constraint and yet they are 
distinctly different from country to country. Up until now, there has been no common 
accepted practice among Member States for determining which scenarios should be 
taken into account in the land use planning process.   
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To address the issue, the Major Accident Hazards Bureau (MAHB) of the European 
Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC), together with the Land-Use Planning Task 
Force, a group of industry and competent authority experts from European Union (EU) 
Member States, produced this Handbook of Scenarios for Assessing Major Chemical 
Accident Risks.  The availability of common reference scenarios allows the possibility for 
all authorities to consider the full range of possible outcomes when assessing risks 
associated with a major hazard site.  Although it does not in any way ensure that 
authorities will arrive at similar risk figures or planning decisions, it gives a common 
framework in which the rules of science and logic can be applied.  The use of common 
reference scenarios can, in particular, give citizens more confidence that authorities are 
ensuring that all necessary measures are being taken to reduce the impacts from serious 
chemical accidents. 
The Handbook gives recommendations on possible major accident scenarios in the form 
of scenario trees. It is expected that the scenario recommendations will be useful to EU 
Member States and third countries who do not have a fixed LUP approach in place. A 
scenario tree is a taxonomy that shows the most relevant ways that an accident 
involving a certain dangerous substance may occur, using the structure of a bow-tie 
diagram. The scenario trees presented in the Handbook describe the dangerous 
substance and piece of equipment that may be involved in the accident, the critical event 
and the dangerous phenomena following the critical event. In the Handbook, five 
dangerous substances and four pieces of equipment have been identified and developed 
as scenario trees. These trees contain the main qualitative information with regards to 
potential sequences of events following a release.  They can be used for land-use 
planning decisions or for emergency planning. The Handbook also offers a list of possible 
causes and safety barriers for the scenario trees studied. Therefore, quantitative 
information and data can be added to the qualitative description of the scenarios in order 
to make them quantifiable. 
The Handbook proposes basic sets of scenarios and data input options to support 
consistent and transparent decision-making in land-use planning decisions associated 
with implementation of the Seveso Directive (2012/18/EU).   This information is 
primarily aimed to assist EU Member States and other Seveso implementing countries in 
land-use planning, especially those that do have not consolidated a systematic approach 
of scenarios and criteria for assessing land-use planning cases in compliance with the 
requirements of the Seveso Directive. In addition, it is also possible to use the scenarios 
for emergency planning, provided outcomes are interpreted to conform with criteria 
appropriate for emergency response applications. 
 
The Handbook begins with a general chapter that explains its overall purpose and scope, 
and, in particular, the importance of the accident scenario in risk assessment for 
chemical accident prevention and preparedness.  The subsequent seven chapters provide 
common reference scenarios for each of 6 types of dangerous substances commonly 
used throughout the European Union (EU).  The final chapter describes a benchmarking 
exercise in which eight different teams of experts from regional and national authorities 
of the EU conduct risk assessments for land-use planning on two fictitious sites using the 
common reference scenarios in this handbook.    
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1 Purpose and scope of the handbook 
1.1 Background  
An EU Technical Working Group on Land-Use Planning was first established in 1996 to 
study existing land-use planning practices in Member States. Most of the Member States 
did not have a consolidated land-use planning approach established at that time, while 
those who did were employing different approaches with varying results. This 
discrepancy in approaches, and corresponding diversity in decision outcomes of the land-
use planning process in the different countries, was documented reported in the 
European Commission Guidance on Land Use Planning produced by this group (Christou 
and Porter, 1999) and in the literature (Christou et.al., 1999; Cozzani et.al., 2006). In 
the aftermath of the accident in Toulouse, a seminar on land-use planning was organised 
by the French Authorities and the JRC in Lille, France. The lack of transparency and 
consistency in land-use planning processes under Seveso across the EU emerged as a 
common concern.  It was recognised that significant differences in Member State 
approaches could, and probably did, lead to vastly different decisions in EU Member 
States on what constituted an appropriate safety distance between similar uses vis-à-vis 
a given risk profile.  These differences were largely due to the diversity of inputs and 
approaches associated with the consequence analysis, including the scenarios, criteria, 
models, frequency and other assumptions, as well as the acceptance criteria and 
decision-making frameworks of the different Member States.  In this situation, national 
government was particularly vulnerable to accusations of underregulation or 
overregulation (depending on the situation) in comparison to other Member States.  
In theory, the logical solution would have been to develop a harmonized approach and 
common risk acceptance criteria for universal application across the EU, but historical 
norms and culture differences (especially in risk tolerance) between Member States 
rendered such an outcome unlikely.  Instead, the seminar findings included a 
recommendation that, in the place of harmonized approaches, the definition of common 
principles and common scenarios, and the availability – as much as possible - of 
common data sets for use in frequency and modelling the consequence analysis within 
risk assessments could establish a level of comparability between Member State land-
use planning processes under Seveso. Seminar participants considered that use of a 
common knowledgebase would lead to more consistent decisions in similar risk situations 
across the EU, and thus help enormously with the transparency and the ‘dependability’ 
(i.e., the ease with which certain decisions can be defended in a public debate) of 
resulting decisions. In addition, the participants recommended the revival of the 
Technical Working Group.  
As a result, the 2003 amendment of the Seveso Directive (Council Directive 
2003/105/EC) brought a mandate for the European Commission to develop guidelines "in 
close cooperation with the Member States defining a technical database including risk 
data and risk scenarios". In the context of the respective work, the re-activated group, 
renamed the European Working Group on Land-Use Planning (EWGLUP), developed a 
new guideline document (Christou et.al., 2006) and a report summarising of 
““roadmaps” of good practice (Basta, et.al., 2008). 
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One of the mandates of the EWGLUP Group was the development of a commonly agreed 
database of risk and hazard assessment data (RHAD). This development was based on 
the risk assessment practice of sources such as the Dutch “Purple Book”, the ARAMIS 
project (Delvosalle et.al, 2005), etc. Based on this requirement, RHAD was intended to 
facilitate systematic selection of scenarios for land-use planning purposes (Christou et.al, 
2006).  
The European Commission disbanded the EWGLUP in 2011 concluding that its work was 
largely completed with the exception of the technical database. The development of a 
common database for land-use planning proved infeasible because of the variations of 
existing examples and practices in the Member States.  Taking over from the EWGLUP, 
the Task Force on Land-Use Planning conceived the idea of defining common reference 
scenarios as an alternative.  This Handbook represents the fruits of their collaboration on 
this topic.  
1.2 Purpose of the Handbook 
This Handbook is primarily aimed to assist the EU Member States and other Seveso 
implementing countries in land-use planning, especially those that have not consolidated 
a systematic approach to selecting scenarios and criteria for assessing land-use planning 
cases in the context of Seveso Directive implementation.  It is also possible to use the 
scenarios for emergency planning, provided outcomes are interpreted to conform with 
criteria appropriate for emergency response applications. It is also acknowledged that 
even when the same scenario is selected for similar sites, results may differ significantly 
due to application of different data, models and assumptions.   
The contents of the Handbook are not recommendations, but rather they represent 
recognized good practice within the EU Member States. As such, its use is not obligatory.  
It is expected that authorities engaged in land-use planning will use it as a handbook, or 
as a collection of reference scenarios that are typically associated with land-use 
planning. Its content does not exclude the possibility of additional scenarios, that may be 
required for a specific case, and it is understood that particular installations may require 
different scenarios all together. Nonetheless, the information herein may be considered a 
good starting point for a land-use planning risk assessment and definition of appropriate 
safety distances, with direct application to many sites, or alternatively, providing ideas 
for developing new and different scenarios for other sites and circumstances.   
As of 4th July 2012 the Seveso III Directive was published and will be in force from 1st 
June 2015. The former Article 12 of the Seveso II Directive is now Article 13 of Directive 
2012/18/EC (Seveso III). As this report is mainly focused on the technical matters of the 
requirements of land-use planning in the context of the Seveso Directive the editors 
abstain from a detailed analysis or interpretation of text modifications. It only shall be 
noted that the mandate for the elaboration of a common database for land-use planning 
tasks was deleted, whereas all the relevant requirements of the former Article 12 
remain. It is an undisputed target of the implementation of EU legislation to seek to 
achieve coherent and common enforcement as far as possible; the Handbook remains a 
useful tool for meeting this target.  
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1.3  Accident Scenarios 
Every land-use and emergency planning approach starts with evaluation of the 
consequences associated with a credible major accident scenario.  Some sites may have 
only a few credible accident scenarios, for example, warehouses and fuel storage depots, 
but as more processes and hazard substances are present on the site, the number of 
potential accident scenarios that can be generated will also increase.  It is particularly 
important to select accident scenario or scenarios that are most representative of the 
actual risk present on the site to ensure effective implementation of land-use planning 
policy. 
1.4 What is a scenario? 
A scenario describes the conditions that might lead to a major accident and the potential 
consequences, which in most cases is the loss of containment (LOC) also known as the 
critical event (CE), of a hazardous substance, or the change of state of a solid substance, 
combined with particular conditions that eventually lead to a fire, explosion, and/or toxic 
release. In the EU Seveso Land-Use Planning Guidelines a “scenario” to be used for LUP 
risk analysis is defined as: 
Scenario = “Top Event” (usually/mostly Loss of Containment) & Dangerous Phenomenon 
(fire, explosion, toxic cloud) 
This definition means that two elements generally analyzed separately are merged in 
order to simplify the assessment.  It is represented below using  the so-called bow-tie 
diagram: 
 
Figure 1   A scenario as depicted in a bow-tie diagramme 
As indicated on the left side of the bow tie, a reference scenario typically starts with an 
initiating event (IE) that leads to the critical event (CE), usually the loss of containment.   
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The right side of the bow tie depicts the development of the scenario (SCE) after the 
“critical event” leading to the realization of a dangerous phenomenon (DP) or 
phenomena that produce undesirable consequences.  Table 1 below shows typical 
examples of each of these categories. 
Table 1 Examples of elements of a typical accident scenario  
Initiating 
Event 
Critical Event Dangerous 
phenomena 
Undesirable 
consequence 
Overpressure Catastrophic vessel 
failure 
Boiling Liquid 
Expanding Vapour 
Explosion (BLEVE) 
Employees killed or 
injured, property 
damage 
Corrosion Hole in vessel wall Pool fire Property damage 
Loose flange Pipe leak Toxic release Environmental damage  
When selecting accident scenarios for land-use planning, in theory the user would 
initially derive a number of generic accident scenarios, based only on the substance and 
the type of installation (e.g. atmospheric, pressurised or cryogenic storage, pipeline, 
loading/unloading, etc.). These scenarios could be evaluated in a probabilistic or 
deterministic way using the relevant data and compatibility with existing land uses.   If 
incompatibility between the site and the land-use are found, the user could then review 
the events leading to the final undesirable outcome of the scenario, to identify 
opportunities for preventing the critical event or for reducing the impact of events 
following the critical event.  As such, the consequence analysis process is useful tool for 
not only estimating risk but identifying additional technical measures that could 
eliminate or reduce the likelihood or consequences of a potential accident scenario.  
The European Working Group on Land Use Planning (EWGLUP) agreed on the following 
principles for the selection of scenarios (Christou et. al., 2006): 
• Reference scenarios to be used for estimating consequences as part of the risk 
analysis process for land-use planning may be selected by the frequency of their 
occurrence and the severity of their consequences. 
• “Worst Case” scenarios are not necessarily the basis for land-use planning, but may 
rather be considered as a matter of Emergency Planning, further to the requirement 
to implement best practice or standards to reduce worst case events to a “negligible” 
frequency.  
• The time scale of the consequences of a specific scenario to come into effect shall be 
considered in the selection. 
• According to the chosen level of likelihood for the occurrence of a reference scenario 
the effectiveness of barriers may be taken into account in the selection. 
• Land-use planning is both a prevention and mitigation measure offsite, which 
requires as a minimum that relevant good practice as published in standards has 
been implemented onsite. 
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Procedure for Selecting a Scenario for Land-Use or Emergency Planning 
The selection of a scenario to identify risk potential for planning purposes is a simple 
procedure.  The selection should always be based following identification of specific hazard 
source, which in the case of the Seveso Directive, are fixed establishments where 
dangerous substances are present in Seveso threshold  
Step 1: Select the substance relevant to the hazardous establishment. 
Step 2: With reference to the specific establishment, select the type of installation and 
examine the conditions (pressure, temperature). 
Step 3: Get List of scenarios from the Database. 
Step 4: For each scenario, evaluate the LUP case, according to the selected assessment 
method and the relevant criteria (as determined by the Seveso competent and planning 
authorities in the jurisdiction). 
Step 5: If the risks associated with the particular scenario are incompatible with the land-
uses, examine the sequence of events, that is each subevent in the scenario, to identify 
opportunities for risk reduction. 
Step 6: Evaluate each subevent, with regards to its frequency or conditions, according to 
the accepted methods and criteria of the relevant jurisdiction. 
Step 7:  Consider which subevents could be prevented or modified by applying an 
additional technical measure. Obtain a list of relevant technical measures from the 
database, together with indications of their reliability and cost. 
Step 8:  Select an appropriate technical measure(s). Re-evaluate the scenario taking into 
consideration the additional technical measure(s). Repeat from Step 4.   
1.5 Scenario trees provided in the Handbook 
As a guiding principle, the Handbook aims to provide accident scenario trees for the 
most relevant types of equipment and dangerous substances.  To achieve this objective, 
the authors conducted research to collect and compare accident scenarios used for land-
use planning purposes in the EU Member States, starting with liquefied petroleum gas 
(LPG), chlorine and ammonia. Following the first phase of collecting information on 
selected substances, the Group also provided information on liquefied natural gas (LNG), 
flammable liquids and liquid oxygen.  
The JRC analysed the resulting inventory of scenarios to identify similarities and 
differences.  The selection of the definitive scenarios for these substances were based on 
a consensus of the expert group based on experience that these dangerous substances 
and pieces of equipment are the most commonly used ones. 
The scenario trees are presented in this book by substance with one chapter for each 
substance. The last chapter describes a case study application of some scenarios 
presented in the handbook.  The scenarios are codified in the form of so-called “scenario 
trees”.   
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Selected Topics of Scenario Trees in the Handbook 
Substances 
• Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) 
• Anhydrous ammonia 
• Chlorine 
• Liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
• Flammable liquids 
• Liquefied oxygen 
 
Equipment Type 
• Storage tank 
• Pipework 
• Pump or pump/compressor 
• Loading/unloading arm/hose 
• Tank car/wagon 
• Carrier 
 
Main critical events associated with the equipment: 
• Instantaneous release/catastrophic rupture/full bore rupture  
• Leak 
A scenario tree is a taxonomy that shows the most relevant ways an accident involving a 
certain dangerous substance may happen. It describes the dangerous substance and 
piece of equipment where the accident may happen, the Critical Event (e.g. leak, 
catastrophic failure, etc.), the Dangerous Phenomena following this critical event (e.g. 
toxic gas dispersion, flash-fire, pool-fire, etc.), the Effects (e.g. thermal radiation, 
overpressure, etc.) and finally possible Causes and Safety Barriers.  
The scenarios depicted in the scenario trees in the Handbook contain the main 
qualitative information with regards to “what can happen”.  They can be used for land-
use or emergency planning decisions as the most relevant scenarios for planning 
purposes. Quantitative information and data can be added to the qualitative description 
of the scenarios in order to make them quantifiable.  
The Handbook provides a set of accident scenarios as good practice examples. These 
scenarios describe the conditions that might lead to a major accident and the potential 
consequences for 6 specific substances or categories of substance and 6 types of 
equipment.  The task group chose the substance and equipment type as the basis of the 
Handbook scenarios on the basis that: 
1) They are the most common scenarios required for Seveso land use and emergency 
planning decisions in EU/EEA countries, 
2) The basic elements of the scenarios do not vary significantly from country to country 
3) LOC events for these equipment are described in detail in well-known reference 
documents, including the Purple Book (CPR 18), the Handbook of Failure Frequencies 
2009 (Flemish Government, 2009), and the MIMAH procedure (Delvosalle et.al., 2006).   
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1.6 Scenario limitations - Possible physical effects for fires and 
explosions 
The scenarios present outcomes that can be predicted from release of specific 
substances under specific circumstances.  It should be emphasised here that these 
scenarios represent the basic structure of a typical scenario involving each substance 
and associated equipment and processes.  It is up to the individual user, depending on 
the specific facility, equipment and processes involved, to select additional properties 
necessary for a complete consequence analysis, such as size of release, pipe diameter, 
wind speed, etc.  
 
Moreover, fires and BLEVEs can produce additional phenomena, that are not depicted in 
the scenarios presented here, mainly because the generation of additional phenomena 
depends on individual circumstances at the site.  The following figures show the different 
possible phenomena that can be produced from jet, pool, and flash fires as well as 
BLEVEs.  Users should identify these additional phenomena as possible outcomes of fires 
and BLEVEs as may be necessary depending on individual properties associated with the 
site-specific process, equipment and location information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Common features of EU Member State Land-Use Planning 
Approaches 
• It is acknowledged that there may be substantial differences in the 
decision making processing associated with land-use planning around 
Seveso sites.  However, there are also a number of commonalities  
• Land-use planning policies generally aim to allow hazardous operations – 
if possible – without imposing any risk to the population outside the 
fenceline. 
• Policies encourage the application of “state-of-the-art” technology to 
reduce risk at the source 
• Development restrictions are generally achieved through specific zoning 
regulations 
• Specific land-use planning decisions typically are made on the basis of 
relevant accident scenarios 
• Absolute “worst case scenarios” are generally not considered appropriate 
as a basis for land-use planning decisions. 
• Land-use planning to fulfill the Seveso Directive obligation is a political 
decision based on technical advice. 
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Figure 2  Physical effects of a pool fire 
Note: Only thermal radiation needs to be considered if the area for direct flame contact 
is contained by the area for thermal radiation. 
 
 
  
  Figure 3  Physical effects of a jet fire 
 
Note: Only thermal radiation needs to be considered if the area for direct flame contact 
is contained by the area for thermal radiation. 
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Figure 4  Physical effects of a flash fire and vapour cloud explosion 
 
Note:  
A vapour cloud explosion may occur in the presence of confined or congested areas. This 
phenomenon is always accompanied by the flash fire. 
For flash fire, it is common practice to only consider direct flame contact. Thermal 
radiation contours may be slightly larger than the flame footprint, but are hard to 
calculate due to the dynamics of the combustion of the cloud. 
 
 
Figure 5  Physical effects of a fireball and BLEVE 
Note: A BLEVE may occur for flammable and non-flammable substances. For flammable 
substances, a BLEVE is often accompanied by a fireball. 
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2 Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Scenarios 
This chapter provides scenario trees for Liquefied Petroleum Gas as follows: 
2.1 LPG above ground pressurised storage tank 
2.2 LPG pump/compressor 
2.3 LPG pipework  
2.4 LPG loading/unloading arm/hose  
2.5  LPG road tanker/rail tanker  
 
2.1 LPG above ground pressurised storage tank 
Selected scenarios for LPG storage tank 
 
2a Leak in the tank 
2b Instantaneous release 
 
 
Figure 6  2a Leak in above ground and pressurised LPG storage tank 
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Figure 7  2b Instantaneous release above ground pressurised LPG storage tank 
2.2   LPG pump/compressor  
Selected scenarios for pump/compressor 
2c Pump/compressor leak 
2d Pump/compressor catastrophic failure/full bore rupture 
 
 
Figure 8  2c LPG pump/compressor leak 
     
 
Figure 9 2d LPG pump/compressor catastrophic rupture 
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2.3 LPG Pipework 
Selected scenarios for LPG pipework 
2e Leak on the pipework 
2f Pipework full bore rupture 
 
 
Figure 10 2e LPG leak – pipework 
 
 
Figure 11  2f Pipework full bore rupture 
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2.4  LPG loading/unloading arm/hose 
Selected scenarios for LPG loading/unloading arm/hose 
2g Leak on the arm/hose 
2h Loading/unloading arm/hose full bore rupture 
 
 
 
Figure 12   2g Leak LPG loading/unloading arm/hose 
 
 
 
Figure 13  2h LPG loading/unloading arm/hose full bore rupture 
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2.5 LPG road tanker/rail tanker 
Selected scenarios for LPG road tanker/rail tanker 
2i Leak on the road tanker/rail tanker 
2j Instantaneous release road tanker/rail tanker 
 
 
 
Figure 14  2i 2a Leak on the LPG road tanker/rail tanker 
 
Figure 15  2j LPG instantaneous release road tanker/rail tanker 
31 
 
3 Anhydrous ammonia accident scenarios   
This chapter provides scenario trees for anhydrous ammonia as follows: 
3.1 Anhydrous ammonia storage tank 
3.2 Anhydrous ammonia pump/compressor 
3.3 Anhydrous ammonia pipework 
3.4 Anhydrous ammonia loading/unloading arm/hose  
3.5 Anhydrous ammonia road tanker/rail tanker 
 
Anhydrous ammonia is both toxic and flammable substance.  These characteristics 
should be taken into account in the scenarios. 
 
3.1 Anhydrous ammonia storage tank 
Selected scenarios for anhydrous ammonia storage tank 
3a Anhydrous ammonia storage tank - pressurised at ambient temperature 
3b Anhydrous ammonia storage tank - atmospheric pressure refrigerated 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16  3a Scenarios for anhydrous ammonia storage tank pressurised at ambient 
temperature 
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Figure 17  3b Scenarios for anhydrous ammonia atmospheric pressure refrigerated 
storage tank 
 
3.2 Anhydrous ammonia pump/compressor 
Selected scenarios for anhydrous ammonia pump/compressor 
3c Leak pump/compressor  
3d Pump/compressor catastrophic failure/full bore rupture 
 
 
 
Figure 18  3c-d Scenarios for anhydrous ammonia pump/compressor 
 
  
33 
 
 
3.3   Anhydrous ammonia pipework  
Selected scenarios for anhydrous ammonia pipework 
3e Leak on the pipework 
3f Pipework full bore rupture 
 
 
 
Figure 19  3e-f Scenarios for anhydrous ammonia pipework 
 
3.4 Anhydrous ammonia loading/unloading arm/hose  
Selected scenarios for anhydrous ammonia loading/unloading arm/hose 
3g Leak on the arm/hose 
3h Loading /unloading arm/hose full bore rupture 
 
 
 
Figure 20  3g-h Scenarios for anhydrous ammonia loading/unloading arm/hose 
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3.5 Anhydrous ammonia road tanker/rail tanker 
Selected scenarios for anhydrous ammonia road tanker/rail tanker 
3i Leak on the road tanker/rail tanker 
3j Instantaneous release road tanker/rail tanker 
 
 
 
Figure 21  3i-j Scenarios for anhydrous ammonia road tanker/rail tanker 
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4 Chlorine Accident Scenarios  
This chapter provides scenario trees for chlorine as follows: 
4.1 Chlorine above ground pressurised storage tank 
4.2 Chlorine pump/compressor 
4.3 Chlorine pipework 
4.4 Chlorine loading/unloading arm/hose 
4.5 Chlorine road tanker/rail tanker    
 
4.1 Chlorine above ground pressurised storage tank  
Selected scenarios for chlorine storage tank 
4a Leak on the tank 
4b Instantaneous release 
 
 
Figure 22  4a-b Scenarios for chlorine pressurised storage tank 
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4.2 Chlorine pump/compressor 
Selected scenarios for chlorine pump/compressor 
4c Leak pump/compressor 
4d Pump/compressor catastrophic failure/full bore rupture 
 
 
 
Figure 23  4c-d Scenarios for chlorine pump/compressor 
 
4.3 Chlorine pipework  
Selected scenarios for Chlorine pipework 
4e Leak on the pipework 
4f Pipework full bore rupture 
 
 
Figure 24  4e-f Scenarios for chlorine pipework 
  
37 
 
4.4 Chlorine loading/unloading arm/hose  
Selected scenarios for Chlorine loading/unloading arm/hose 
4g Leak on the arm/hose 
4h Loading/unloading arm/hose full bore rupture 
 
 
Figure 25  4g-h Scenarios for chlorine loading/unloading arm/hose 
 
4.5 Chlorine road tanker/rail tanker 
Selected scenarios for Chlorine road tanker/rail tanker 
4i Leak on the road tanker/rail tanker 
4j Instantaneous release road tanker/rail tanker 
 
 
Figure 26  4i-j Scenarios for chlorine road tanker/rail tanker 
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5 Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Accident Scenarios 
This chapter provides scenario trees for liquefied natural gas (LNG) as follows: 
5.1 Liquefied natural gas cryogenic atmospheric storage tank 
5.2 LNG pump/compressor 
5.3 LNG pipework 
5.4 LNG loading/unloading arm/hose 
5.5 LNG road tanker/rail tanker 
 
5.1 Liquefied natural gas cryogenic atmospheric storage tank 
Selected scenarios for LNG storage tank 
5a Leak on the tank 
5b Instantaneous release 
5c Roll over 
5d Roof collapse 
 
 
Figure 27  5a-b-c Scenarios for LNG cryogenic atmospheric storage tank 
 
 
Figure 28  5d Roof collapse LNG cryogenic atmospheric cryogenic storage tank 
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5.2 LNG pump/compressor  
Selected scenarios for LNG pump/compressor 
5e Leak pump/compressor 
5f Pump/compressor catastrophic failure/full bore rupture 
 
 
Figure 29  5e LNG pump/compressor leak 
 
 
Figure 30  5f LNG pump/compressor catastrophic failure/full bore rupture 
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5.3 LNG pipework    
Selected scenarios for LNG pipework 
5g Leak on the pipework 
5h Pipework full bore rupture 
 
 
Figure 31  5g Leak LNG pipework 
 
 
Figure 32  5h LNG pipework full bore rupture 
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5.4 LNG loading/unloading arm/hose 
Selected scenarios for LNG loading/unloading arm/hose 
5i Leak on the arm/hose 
5j Loading/unloading arm/hose full bore rupture 
 
 
Figure 33  5i Leak LNG loading/unloading arm/hose 
 
Note: A Rapid Phase Transition (RPT) can occur if spilled LNG is heated so rapidly that 
the expansion of the fluid on vaporisation is so fast that it produces a significant 
pressure wave. RPT is relevant only at release in water. 
 
 
Figure 34  5j LNG loading/unloading arm/hose full bore rupture  
  
42 
 
5.5 LNG road tanker/rail tanker 
Selected scenarios for LNG road tanker/rail tanker 
5k Leak on the road tanker/rail tanker 
5l Instantaneous release road tanker/rail tanker 
5m Leak and roll over LNG carrier 
5n Instantaneous release LNG carrier 
 
 
Figure 35  5k Leak LNG road tanker/rail tanker 
 
 
Figure 36  5l LNG road tanker/rail tanker instantaneous release 
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Figure 37  5m Leak and roll over - LNG carrier 
 
Note: A “roll-over” in an LNG tank can occur if the liquid at the bottom becomes lighter 
than that at the top, and rapidly rises to the surface. The liquid that moves to the top of 
the container experiences a drop in pressure equal, to a first approximation, to the head 
of liquid. It may therefore be above its boiling point at that pressure. In such an event 
the vapour pressure within the tank may be as high as the liquid pressure at the bottom 
of the tank, whence the liquid came, and so the resulting pressure spike might 
overwhelm the pressure relief systems in place and if pipe work is not designed, 
constructed and maintained to cope with these then this might fail. 
 
 
 
Figure 38  5n Instantaneous release LNG carrier 
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6 Flammable Liquids Accident Scenarios 
This chapter provides scenario trees for flammable liquids as follows: 
6.1 Flammable Liquid atmospheric storage tank 
6.2 Flammable Liquid pump 
6.3 Flammable Liquid pipework 
6.4 Flammable Liquid loading/unloading arm/hose 
6.5 Flammable Liquid road tanker/rail tanker 
 
6.1 Flammable Liquid atmospheric storage tank 
Selected scenarios for Flammable Liquid atmospheric storage tank 
6a Leak on the tank 
6b Instantaneous release 
6c Collapse of the roof – floating roof only 
 
 
Figure 39  6a Leak on the flammable liquid atmospheric storage tank 
 
 
Figure 40  6b Instantaneous release flammable liquid atmospheric storage tank 
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Figure 41  6c Collapse of roof - Flammable Liquid atmospheric storage tank with floating 
roof 
 
6.2 Flammable liquid pump 
Selected scenarios for Flammable liquid pump 
6d Leak pump 
6e Pump catastrophic failure/full bore rupture 
 
 
Figure 42  6d Flammable liquid pump leak 
 
 
 
Figure 43  6e Flammable liquid pump catastrophic failure/full bore rupture 
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6.3 Flammable liquid pipework 
Selected scenarios for flammable liquid pipework 
6a Leak on the pipework 
6b Pipework full bore rupture 
 
 
Figure 44  6f Leak- flammable liquid pipework 
 
 
 
Figure 45  6g Flammable liquid pipework full bore rupture 
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6.4 Flammable Liquid loading/unloading arm/hose 
Selected scenarios for Flammable Liquid loading/unloading arm/hose 
6h Leak on the arm/hose 
6i Loading/unloading arm/hose full bore rupture 
 
 
Figure 46  6h Leak on the Flammable Liquid loading/unloading arm/hose 
 
 
Figure 47  6i Flammable liquid loading/unloading arm/hose full bore rupture 
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6.5 Flammable liquid road tanker/rail tanker 
Selected scenarios for Flammable Liquid road tanker/rail tanker 
6j Leak on the road tanker/rail tanker 
6k Instantaneous release road tanker/rail tanker  
 
 
Figure 48  6j Leak on the flammable liquid road tanker/rail tanker 
 
 
 
 
Figure 49  6k Instantaneous release from a flammable liquid road tanker/rail tanker 
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7 Liquefied Oxygen Accident Scenarios 
This chapter provides scenario trees for liquefied oxygen as follows: 
7.1 Liquefied oxygen cryogenic storage tank 
7.2 Liquefied oxygen pump 
7.3 Liquefied oxygen pipework 
7.4 Liquefied oxygen loading/unloading arm/hose 
 
7.1 Liquefied oxygen cryogenic storage tank 
Selected scenarios for liquefied oxygen cryogenic storage tank 
7a Leak on the tank 
7b Instantaneous release 
 
 
Figure 50  7a-b Scenarios liquefied oxygen cryogenic tank 
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7.2 Liquefied oxygen pump 
Selected scenarios for liquefied oxygen pump 
7c Leak pump 
7d Pump catastrophic failure/full bore rupture 
 
 
Figure 51  7c-d Scenarios for liquefied oxygen pump 
 
7.3 Liquefied oxygen pipework  
Selected scenarios for liquefied oxygen pipework 
7e Leak on the pipework 
7f Pipework full bore rupture 
 
 
Figure 52  7e-f Scenarios for LOX pipework 
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7.4 Liquefied oxygen loading/unloading arm/hose 
Selected scenarios for LOX loading/unloading arm/hose 
7g Leak on the arm/hose 
7h Loading/unloading arm/hose full bore rupture 
 
 
Figure 53  7g-h Scenarios for liquefied oxygen loading/unloading arm/hose 
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8 Case Studies Using the Scenario Trees 
This chapter presents a case study performed by the Task Force that demonstrates the 
scenario trees in this handbook can be used in a risk assessment procedures to support 
land-use and emergency planning. The specific research objectives of the case study 
were:  
• To highlight similarities and understand differences among the different national 
approaches against the same study case; and 
• To evaluate the functionality of the scenario trees as an inventory of good 
practices for assessing land-use planning cases.   
The case study results also aimed to show that different risk assessment and decision-
making procedures will produce different results even if the same scenario is applied.    
The case study therefore consisted of involving experts from representatives from 
different countries to apply the same scenarios to the same (fictitious) facilities using 
their own risk assessment procedure (a standardised approach determined at national 
level in each country) to the case study.  They also were to apply the relevant national 
or regional decision-making procedure for land-use planning to the results to achieve a 
land-use planning recommendation for the fictitious case study.   
The case study was centred on two fictitious facilities, one that handled and stored 
chlorine and one that handled and stored LPG. These two reference substances and 
facilities were selected because (1) chlorine and LPG are commonly used substances in 
industrial processes and (2) these types of facilities use standardised processes and are 
therefore are fairly similar across the European Union. For each facility, the layout 
(location of equipment, size of buildings and storage areas, etc.) was pre-defined for use 
in the case study. Specific land-use planning questions were also selected to analyse and 
apply the results of the risk assessment in different national contexts (i.e., using national 
land-use planning decision-making procedures). 
It is worth stressing that the purpose of the study was not to rank the different land-use 
planning approaches against any particular criterion - for instance - their effectiveness.  
Rather, the goal of this work was to collect data, learn more about how the national 
methodologies work in practice, and analyse the outcomes.  It was expected that this 
new information could assist other countries and regions in developing land-use planning 
policies in the context of the Seveso Directive. 
The case study was carried out by 8 participants representing EU Member States or 
European Autonomous Regions, as follows: 
• Belgium – Flemish Region (SGS) 
• Belgium - Flemish Region (BARN) 
• Belgium – Walloon Region 
• Catalonia 
• France 
• Italy 
• The Netherlands 
• United Kingdom 
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The exercise asked what land-use planning decision that an authority in the relevant 
country would take based on the results of the risk assessment associated with the 
fictitious sites for the following situations:  
• new small residential developments (blocks of 3 houses) located at distances of 
200m; 300m; 400m; 500m; 600m; 700m; 800m and 900m from the plant 
• a school located at 1000m from the plant 
• office areas located at 200m and 800m from the plant.  
The teams used the following risk assessment approaches: 
P1: Quantitative approach  
P2: Semi-quantitative approach 
P3: Quantitative approach  
P4: Quantitative approach 
P5: Quantitative approach 
P6: Quantitative approach 
P7: Quantitative approach 
P8: Semi-quantitative approach 
In the sections that follow the two cases are described, and the results of the analysis 
are presented and compared.  In addition, the assessments from 2 Member States are 
described in depth to illustrate specifically how the scenario trees were used to reach 
land-use planning decisions.  
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8.1 The chlorine facility case study 
The chlorine case study features an unloading operation at a chlorine facility.  Figure 54 
shows how the chlorine installation of the establishment is linked to the road tanker for 
unloading a chlorine delivery. Chlorine is unloaded from road tankers at the unloading 
station (left side of the diagram). Unloading takes place via a 5 m transfer hose into an 
18 m transfer line. The product is stored in two pressurized vessels (centre of the 
diagram). Chlorine is subsequently led through a feed line to a reactor unit. (This reactor 
unit is not considered in the scenario.) 
The entire installation from the unloading station to the reactor unit is equipped with 
automatic gas sensors. If chlorine is detected, a signal will be sent to the control room 
and an alarm will go off. Remotely operated valves that can be closed by an operator in 
the control room, are present at various locations in the plant. The operators in the 
control room have no direct view on the chlorine installation. The pre-defined conditions 
and inputs to the consequence analysis of the scenario are given in Tables 2-7.   
 
 
Figure 544  Illustration of fictitious chlorine facility for case study 
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 Table 2   The chlorine unloading process 
Road tankers • There are 150 road tanker deliveries per year. 
• It is estimated that road tankers are present at the site on average 3 hours 
per delivery. The duration of the actual delivery (flow) is assumed to be 2.5 
hours. All deliveries take place during the daytime (8 am to 8 pm). 
Chlorine in the 
road tankers 
• Upon arrival, the road tankers hold 18,000 kg of chlorine. 
• The temperature of the product is 15 °C. 
• The pressure inside the road tanker is 6.87 bar (absolute). 
Unloading 
hose 
• The unloading hose is 5 m in length and has an internal diameter of 50 mm. 
Transfer line • The transfer line is 18 meters long and has an internal diameter of 50 mm. 
• The transfer line is connected to the vessel at the top. 
• The transfer line is only used during offloading operations.  
• The transfer line is outside, 1 m above the ground. 
Unloading 
process 
• Unloading takes place via a 5 m long hose that is attached to a 50 mm 
internal diameter single flanged joint on the road tanker. 
• The mean flow is 2 kg/s. 
• The road tanker is equipped with an internal pump with flow control. In case 
of an incident, the flow rate from the tanker will be limited by this pump to a 
maximum of 3 kg/s. 
• The road tanker is fitted with a remotely operated valve (ROV). The ROV is 
operated from the control room.  
• If the ROV closes, the outflow from the road tanker will stop. There will still 
be a backflow of vapour through a 50 mm internal diameter pipe fitted to the 
top of the vessel. This backflow will last until a manual valve at the vessel is 
closed (assumed 20 minutes). There will also be a release of about 50 kg 
chlorine from the hose and transfer line. 
• If the unloading hose ruptures or leaks, and the ROV at the road tanker 
closes, the outflow from the road tanker will stop. There will still be a 
backflow of vapour through the 50 mm internal diameter pipe fitted to the 
top of the vessel. This backflow will last until a manual valve at the vessel is 
closed (assumed 20 minutes). The 50 kg of 2-phase chlorine in the hose and 
transfer line will also be released. 
• If the transfer line ruptures or leaks, and the ROV at the road tanker closes, 
the outflow from the road tanker will stop. There will still be a backflow of 
vapour through the 50 mm internal diameter pipe fitted to the top of the 
vessel. This backflow will last until a manual valve at the vessel is closed 
(assumed 20 minutes). The 50 kg of 2-phase chlorine in the hose and 
transfer line will also be released. 
• There is no diked area around the unloading station. 
• No vapour return is used for the unloading activities. 
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Table 3  Chlorine storage vessels 
Storage 
vessels 
• Two identical pressurised vessels are used for storage. For reasons of 
simplicity, the vessels are assumed to be at the same location. 
• There is no bund around the vessels. 
• There is an excess flow valve (EFV) at the outlet of the vessels. This outlet is 
located 1 m above the ground. The EFV closes if the flow exceeds 3 kg/s. One 
minute is required to close the valve. 
• A remotely operated valve (ROV) is installed after a 50 cm long piece of in-
between piping. 
Chlorine in the 
storage 
vessels 
• The maximum amount of chlorine in a vessel is 80,000 kg. Most of the time, 
one of the vessels is fully filled and the other vessel is partly filled. The 
average amount of chlorine in each of the vessels is 60,000 kg. 
• The temperature in the vessels is 15 °C. The product is 2-phase. Therefore, 
the pressure in the tank is 5.87 bar (absolute). 
Feed line from 
storage to the 
reactor unit 
• There is a 50 m long feed line between the ROV and the reactor unit. This 
feed line has 6 flanges.  
• The internal diameter is 25 mm. 
• The feed line is outside, 1 m above ground. 
Process – 
storage to 
reactor unit 
• The reactor unit uses chlorine during 10% of the time. During production, the 
average flow rate from the vessel to the reactor unit is 1 kg/s. During the 
remaining 90% of the time, flow from the vessel is blocked by a valve. 
• If the feed line ruptures or leaks, the outflow from the vessel will stop if the 
EFV or the ROV at the outlet of the vessel closes. There will be no backflow 
from the plant. The amount of chlorine in the feed line is about 35 kg. 
The process 
plant 
• The plant itself is not considered. The chlorine is consumed directly. No 
chlorine will be released due to plant processes in case of an incident. 
 
Table 4  Site control and management systems  
The control 
system of the 
chlorine 
Facility   
• Chlorine will be delivered when one of the storage tanks is almost empty. The 
chlorine vessels are equipped with a standard level control and the levels can 
be read by operators in the control room. A warning will be issued in the 
operator room when a control detects a level of 90%. 
Safety system 
of the chlorine 
facility   
 
• A written procedure exists for the unloading activities. Prior to the start of the 
unloading activity operators in the control room will determine which storage 
tank will be filled. Part of this procedure is that operators need to check the 
level of both storage tanks prior to unloading. 
• The chlorine plant is equipped with gas detection and remotely operated 
safety valves. 
• The detection of chlorine is automatic and is designed to be sufficiently 
sensitive for both leaks and ruptures. Upon detection, the sensors will 
transmit a signal to the control room. In the control room, the operator must 
validate the signal and close the right valve with a switch. 
• The probabilities that the remotely operated valves will not close (due to 
failing detection, operator error or failing valves) are unknown. Default values 
need to be used. Default values also need to be used for the time required for 
the gas detection, operator action and subsequent closing of the valve. 
 
 57 
 
Table 5  General conditions of the site 
Meteorological 
data   
• The following meteorological classes are used: 
- Neutral weather (Pasquill class D), wind speed 2.4 m/s (D 2.4) 
- Neutral weather (Pasquill class D), wind speed 4.3 m/s (D 4.3) 
- Neutral weather (Pasquill class D), wind speed 6.7 m/s (D 6.7) 
- Stable weather (Pasquill class F),  wind speed 2.4 m/s (F 2.4) 
• Neutral weather (Pasquill class D) may occur both day and night. Stable 
weather (Pasquill class F) occurs almost exclusively during the night. 
• The average temperatures of the atmosphere and the substrate are 15 °C 
(both day and night). 
Wind direction • The distribution (in 12 sectors) of the wind direction per weather class is 
given in Table 6. 
• A surface roughness length of 300 mm is appropriate for all wind directions. 
Surroundings 
of the 
chlorine 
facility   
 
• The terrain of the plant is square, 200×200 m and centered around the origin. 
• Table 19 gives an overview of the relevant population objects in the vicinity 
of the chlorine site. The same data are shown on a map in Figure 9. 
• There are no airports in the vicinity of the plant. 
• During the day, 90% of the persons are indoors, while 10% are 
outside. During the night, 99% of the persons are indoors, while 1% 
are outside. 
• The ventilation rate for all population objects is 2 air changes per 
hour. 
• The distribution of land uses around the plant is given in Table 7. 
 
Table 6  Distribution of meteorological classes and wind direction sectors 
 345 
-15 
15- 
45 
45- 
75 
75 
-105 
105-
135 
135-
165 
165-
195 
195-
225 
225-
255 
255-
285 
285-
315 
315-
345 
 D 2.4  0.0132 0.0200 0.0192 0.0139 0.0115 0.0098 0.0114 0.0136 0.0116 0.0082 0.0081 0.0096 
 D 4.3  0.0230 0.0378 0.0344 0.0212 0.0155 0.0134 0.0179 0.0203 0.0146 0.0092 0.0097 0.0132 
 D 6.7 0.0554 0.0878 0.0704 0.0352 0.0219 0.0223 0.0362 0.0431 0.0275 0.0139 0.0136 0.0226 
 F 2.4  0.0130 0.0275 0.0308 0.0223 0.0160 0.0104 0.0114 0.0121 0.0081 0.0053 0.0057 0.0074 
Note:  The wind direction equals the direction towards which the wind is blowing. 
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Table 7  Population objects (land use) around the chlorine plant 
Code Object X-coordinate Y-coordinate Population 
A School 0 1000 100 
A Group of three houses 0 1000 9 
B Group of three houses 0 900 9 
C Group of three houses 0 800 9 
C Office building 0 -800 150 
D Group of three houses 0 700 9 
E Group of three houses 0 600 9 
F Group of three houses 0 500 9 
G Group of three houses 0 400 9 
H Group of three houses 0 300 9 
I Group of three houses 0 200 9 
I Office building 0 -200 150 
 
8.2 The LPG depot case study 
Figure 55 gives an overview of the configuration of the LPG depot. Propane and butane 
are unloaded from rail tankers in the unloading station (left side of the diagram). 
Unloading takes place via 5 m long transfer arms into 18 m long transfer lines. Propane 
is stored in two cylindrical vessels in a mound. Butane is stored in a separate pressurised 
spherical vessel. Product can subsequently be transferred to a road tanker loading 
station, from where it will leave the depot. Specific schemes for the unloading and 
loading activities are shown in Figures 56-57-58.  
The entire depot is equipped with a fully automatic gas detection and blocking system 
(hereafter called the ‘safety system’). If flammable gasses are detected at the depot, a 
signal will be sent to the control room, an alarm will go off and all automatic valves will 
close. The safety system can also be triggered by various manual push-buttons around 
the loading and unloading stations and by sudden pressure drops in the storage tanks 
and other triggers.  The pre-defined conditions and inputs to the consequence analysis of 
the scenario are given in Tables 8-11.  The general conditions for the LPG depot case 
study are the same as for the chlorine facility case study (Tables 5-7).  
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Figure 55  Overview of the LPG depot 
 
 
Figure 56  Unloading of propane or butane: liquid lines 
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Figure 57  Unloading of propane or butane: vapour return lines 
 
 
 
Figure 58  Loading of LPG 
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Table 8  The LPG unloading process 
The unloading station 
(rail tankers) 
• The unloading station has two delivery points, one for propane 
and one for butane. 
• There are 1000 deliveries per year, 900 deliveries of propane 
and 100 deliveries of butane. 
Process of unloading 
propane 
• The capacity of the propane rail tankers is 119 m3. The maximum 
volume of propane in the tankers is 101 m3 (85%). 
• The temperature in the tanker car is 20 °C and the pressure is 9,36 
bar (absolute). 
• The flow rate for unloading is 100 m3/hr (14.07 kg/s). 
• The rail tanker has an internal excess flow valve (EFV), that limits 
the discharge from the rail tanker to a maximum of 25 kg/s. 
• The total duration of each transfer is 1 hour and the total duration of 
the stay at the unloading station is 1 hour and twenty minutes. 
Process of unloading 
butane 
• The capacity of the butane rail tankers is 94 m3. The maximum 
volume of butane in the tankers is 80 m3 (85%). 
• The butane is 100% n-butane. 
• The temperature in the tanker car is 20 °C and the pressure is 3,06 
bar (absolute). 
• The flow rate for unloading is 100 m3/hr (16.25 kg/s). 
• The rail tanker has an internal EFV, that limits the discharge from the 
rail tanker to a maximum of 30 kg/s.  
• The total duration of each transfer is fifty minutes and the total 
duration of the stay at the unloading station is 1 hour and ten 
minutes. 
Propane and butane 
rail tankers  
Both are equipped with: 
• An internal safety valve on the liquid outlet that will close when the 
breakaway coupling breaks and when activated by the safety system. 
• Manual valves on the vapour and liquid outlets. 
• A 75 mm internal diameter liquid outlet. 
• A 75 mm internal diameter vapour inlet 
• A breakaway coupling that detects displacement of the 
tankers 
Unloading station and 
unloading arms 
• The unloading stations are equipped with one unloading arm each. 
• The unloading arms are 5 m in length and consist of a 75 mm 
internal diameter vapour line and a 75 mm internal diameter liquid 
line. 
• The unloading arms are equipped with an emergency shut down 
valve (ESDV) near the transfer line. These valves can be activated by 
the safety system. 
Transfer lines for 
unloading   
• Two liquid transfer lines (one for propane and one for butane) lead 
from the unloading station to the storage vessels. The transfer lines 
are 18 meters long. 
• Two vapour return lines (one for propane and one for butane) go 
from the storage vessels to centrifugal compressors, located 10 
meters left of the vessels. These compressors have a maximum 
capacity of 160 m3 per hour. Further vapour lines leads from the 
compressors to the unloading station. 
• All transfer lines have an internal diameter of 100 mm (DN100). 
• All transfer lines are connected to the vessels at the top. 
• All transfer lines are only used during offloading operations.  
• All transfer lines are located 1 m above the ground. 
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Table 9  The LPG storage vessels 
Storage 
vessels 
• Two cylindrical pressurised vessels are used for the storage of propane. 
• One outdoor spherical vessel is used for storage of butane. 
• For reasons of simplicity, all three vessels are assumed to be at the same 
location (0,0). 
Propane 
storage 
vessels   
• These vessels have a capacity of 2500 m3 each and are placed inside a 
mound (1 m soil cover). The diameter of the vessels is 7.2 m and the length 
64 m. 
• The maximum filling ratio is 0.85, average filling ratio is 0.60 and minimum 
filling 0.07. 
• The temperature in the vessels is 20 °C. The product is 2-phase. Therefore, 
the pressure in the tanks is 8.36 bar (absolute). 
• Two pressure relief valves (PRV) are fitted to the top of the tank. The 
pressure setting of the PRV is 15.5 bar (absolute). The vent stack is located 
10 m above ground, has an internal diameter of 150 mm (DN150) and will 
release vertically. 
Butane 
storage vessel 
• This vessel has a capacity of 700 m3. 
• The maximum filling ratio is 0.55, average filling is 0.35 and minimum filling 
0.07. 
• The vessel is located in a concrete basin of 8 m X 8 m X 1.5 m. 
• The temperature in the vessels is 20 °C. The product is 2-phase. Therefore, 
the pressure in the tanks is 2.06 bar (absolute). 
• Two pressure relief valves (PRV) are fitted to the top of the tank. The 
pressure setting of the PRV is 9.7 bar (absolute). The vent stack is located 
10 m above ground, has an internal diameter of 150 mm (DN150) and will 
release vertically. 
Inlet/outlet 
lines of 
storage 
vessels 
The propane and butane storage vessels are equipped with the following 
inlet/outlet lines: 
• One liquid inlet line (fitted to the top of the tank). 
• One liquid outlet line (fitted to the bottom of the tank). 
• One vapour return line (fitted to the top of the tank). 
• One purging line (nitrogen) (fitted to the top of the tank). 
Storage vessel 
metering 
The propane and butane storage vessels are equipped with the 
following metering: 
• A level gauging system in the tank, connected to the control system and the 
safety system. 
• A flow meter in the liquid outlet line, connected to the control system and 
the safety system. 
• Pressure and temperature meters in the outlet lines, connected to the control 
system and safety system 
Storage vessel 
valves 
The propane and butane storage vessels are equipped with the 
following types of valves: 
• All vapour and liquid inlet and outlet lines are equipped with an 
internal safety shut-off valve. This valve can be activated by the 
control system and the safety system and by heat from a nearby fire. 
• All vapour and liquid inlet and outlet lines are equipped with an 
external emergency shutdown valve (ESDV) that can be activated by 
the control system and the safety system. 
• All vapour and liquid inlet and outlet lines are equipped with 
additional manual valves. 
• Each storage tank has two pressure relief valves (PRV) connected to 
a vent stack at 10 m height (effective diameter of PRV 150 mm). 
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Table 10  The LPG loading process 
Loading station for 
road tankers 
• The loading station has two transfer points for the loading of 
LPG road tankers (see Fig.21) 
• There are 2000 transhipments of LPG per year. 
Transfer lines for 
loading   
• Two liquid transfer lines (one for propane and one for butane) 
lead from the storage vessels to a pump (length 20 m) and 
then on to the loading station (length 30 m). There are no 
vapour return lines for the loading activity. 
• The pumps are located 20 m left of the vessels. 
• The propane pump has a maximum capacity of 150 m3 per 
hour and a maximum head of 22 bar. 
• The butane pump has a maximum capacity of 60 m3 per hour 
and a maximum head of 7 bar. 
• Both pumps are centrifugal pumps. 
• All transfer lines have an internal diameter of 100 mm 
(DN100). 
• All transfer lines are only used during loading operations. 
• All transfer lines are located 1 m above the ground. 
Loading arms   • The loading station has two filling points and two loading 
arms. Both loading arms are 5 m in length and have an 
internal diameter of 100 mm. 
• Each loading arm is equipped with an emergency shutdown 
valve (ESDV) close to the transfer line. These valves can be 
activated by the safety system. 
Road tankers • All LPG road tankers are equipped with: 
• A 100 mm (DN100) internal diameter liquid inlet. 
• A breakaway coupling that detects displacement of the 
tankers 
• An internal safety valve on the liquid inlet that will close when 
the breakaway coupling breaks and when activated by the 
safety system. 
• A manual valve on the liquid inlet. 
LPG in road tankers • The total capacity of the LPG road tankers is 55 m3. The 
maximum volume of LPG in the tankers is 50 m3 (90%). 
• On the average, the LPG consists of 90 wgt% propane and 10 
wgt% butane. 
• The temperature in the tanker car is 20 °C and the pressure is 
8,87 bar (absolute). 
LPG loading process • The flow rate is 60 m3/hr (8.43 kg/s). 
• The total duration of each transfer is fifty minutes and the 
total duration of the stay at the loading station is 1 hour and 
ten minutes. Each vessel will first be filled with butane 
(average 10 wgt%) and then with propane (average 90 
wgt%). 
• There is only transfer of liquefied propane/butane, no transfer 
of vapour. 
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Table 11  General conditions of the LPG site 
Control system of the 
LPG depot   
• The LPG depot is equipped with an automated control system. 
Level controls and control valves are present in all tanks and 
flow meters are present in all transfer lines. The control 
system is connected to the safety system. 
Safety system of 
the LPG depot   
• The safety system is fed by the control system and a number 
of additional independent triggers: 
• Each tank is equipped with a level alarm that is independent 
of the control system. The safety system will be activated 
when the volume in a tank reaches 90% (propane) or 60% 
(butane) of the total vessel volume. 
• The entire depot is equipped with a fully automatic gas 
detection system. Gas detection leads to full activation of the 
safety system. 
• Various manual push-buttons are present around the loading 
and unloading stations. These push buttons activate the 
safety system. According to the procedure, the truck driver 
will be present at the loading stations during the entire 
(un)loading process. 
• Activation of the safety system means that a signal will be 
sent to the control room and all safety valves (including 
ESDVs) connected to the safety system will close 
automatically. 
 
• The probabilities that the emergency shut-down valves will 
not close (due to failing detection, malfunction in automated 
system or failing valves) are unknown. Default values need to 
be used. Default values also need to be used for the time 
required for the gas detection, response time of automated 
system and closing of the valves. 
8.3 Results from the case study exercises 
Table 4 provides an overview of land-use planning decisions following application of the 
scenario in accordance with the relevant risk assessment methodology and land-use 
planning decision procedure of the participating countries and regions.  Figure 59 and 
Table 12 show the land-use planning decisions in spatial and table format.  The results 
can be summarized as follows: 
• Only one country/region (P4) would allow land-use within 300 m of the facility. 
• One country/region (P8) prohibited land-use within 1000 m of the facility. 
• Half of the participants would have allowed residential housing at 600 m. 
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Figure 59  Spatial perspective of land-use planning decisions from the chlorine facility 
analyses 
Table 12   Land-use planning decisions based on the chlorine facility analyses 
 Distance Development Allowed 
A School  1000 m P1,P3,P7 
A 1000 m P1,P2,P3,P4,P5,P6,P7 
B 900 m P1,P2,P3,P4,P5,P6,P7 
C 800 m P1,P2,P3,P4,P5,P6 
K Office building 800 m P1,P3,P4,P5 
D 700 m P1,P2,P4,P5,P6 
E 600 m P1,P2,P4,P5 
F 500 m P1,P2,P4 
G 400 m P1,P2,P4 
H 300 m P4 
I 200 m P4 
J Office building 200 m P4 
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Figure 60  Spatial perspective of land-use planning decision LPG facility analyses 
Table 13 Land-use planning decisions based on the LPG facility analyses 
 Distance Development Allowed 
A School  1000 m ALL 
A 1000 m ALL 
B 900 m ALL 
C 800 m ALL 
K Office building 800 m ALL 
D 700 m ALL 
E 600 m ALL 
F 500 m P1,P2,P4,P5,P6,P7,P8 
G 400 m P1,P2,P4,P5,P6,P7,P8 
H 300 m P1,P2,P4,P5,P6,P7,P8 
I 200 m P2,P5 
J Office building 200 m P5,P6 
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• All but one country would have allowed residential housing at 900 m. 
• Only 3 countries would have permitted the presence of a school at 1000 m distance. 
 
A review of the inputs of each team showed that the loss of containment scenarios and 
frequencies assigned to the same or similar scenarios could vary widely across teams.   
Table 14  Examples of loss of containment (critical event) scenarios and frequencies 
used for pipework failure producing a toxic cloud at the chlorine facility 
       Participant A      Participant B      
Critical Event Frequency Critical Event Frequency 
Equipment failure, 
partial rupture pipe 
leak 15mm diameter 
2 E-07 
Transfer line/full 
bore rupture 1.8 E-05 
Random (corrosion, 
external event …) 
partial rupture, pipe 
leak, 15mm 
diameter 
2 E-07 
Transfer line/leak 
 9 E-05 
Flange leak (seal 
fault) 
4 E-04 
Feed line/ full bore 
rupture 
5 E-6 
Compressors flank 
failure 
4 E-04 
Feed line/leak 
2.5 E-05 
Distances calculated for the chlorine release also varied widely sometimes by more than 
a few 1000 metres, depending on the consequence assessment model used and the 
inputs (e.g., acute exposure threshold).   
As shown in Figure 60 and Table 13, results from applying different risk assessment 
methods and land-use planning approaches varied only slight in regard to the LPG 
facility.  All but 2 countries/regions prohibited development within 200 m of the plant.  
Conversely, 7 out of the 8 countries/regions permitted development at 300 m and 
beyond. At 600 m every country region allowed development. 
As with the chlorine case study, LOC scenarios and associated frequencies varied 
considerably, except that frequencies assigned to the scenarios were generally rather 
low (< 10-6).  Hence, variation in distance calculations did not cause a considerable 
variation in the land-use planning decisions of each participating team.  In general, most 
land-uses were permitted within 300 m of the plant given the low probability that an 
accident could cause a fatality or injury in the area. 
In both case studies, teams assessed a wide range of scenarios.  The scenarios with the 
worst outcomes in terms of probability of death or serious injury in proximity to the 
plant, drove the land-use planning decisions.  Also, in these cases,participants allowed a 
number of safety barriers to reduce the probability associated with certain dangerous 
phenonema, and these barriers were described in their documentation. 
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8.4 Conclusions 
The outcome of the benchmarking exercise supports the use of common scenarios across 
European Union and affiliated countries as a way of achieving more consistency and 
transparency in how Member State land-use planning (and emergency planning) 
decisions in how land-use planning decisions are made.  Even though there still 
remained numerous inputs that caused considerable variation in the outcomes in 
different locations, the assessment frameworks followed a common structure and 
decisions were made on the basis of calculations and logic produced within this 
structure.   
Regardless of any other circumstances, certain dangerous substances have the potential 
to produce dangerous phenomena. Consistent with this principle, common reference 
scenarios provide a common starting point for any risk assessment associated with 
release of the specific substance involved. The use of scientifically-determined common 
reference scenarios within the European Union can be an additional assurance for living 
near hazardous facilities citizens that all necessary measures have been taken to protect 
man and the environment from chemical accidents.  
Annex 1 contains an example of the assessment of the chlorine facility case study by 
the United Kingdom. 
Annex 2 contains the assessment of the LPG facility case study conducted by the 
Netherlands. 
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9 Annex I: Assessment of the Chlorine facility LUP Case by 
one Member State: United Kingdom (HSE) 
 
Application of RHAD Event trees to Chlorine Case Study 
This note illustrates the application of the chlorine event trees to the chlorine case study 
(see description at Appendix 2) by the HSE in the UK.  Where necessary, HSE standard 
LUP assumptions have been used to supplement the information in the event trees and 
case study. 
Scenario development 
The relevant event tree was applied to each section of the hypothetical chlorine 
establishment. 
Scenario Tree 1. Road Tanker (Event tree “Scenario for chlorine tank 
car/wagon”) 
A road tanker is present on site for 150 x 3 hours per year.  This is a presence factor of 
0.05 and this will be used to factor the failure rates used. 
 
Catastrophic failure 
For catastrophic failure, HSE assumes that 50% of the events eject the entire inventory 
into the cloud (“upward release”) which is then assumed to disperse.  The remaining 
50% eject half of the inventory into the cloud (“downward release”) and half into a liquid 
pool on the ground.  The evaporation from the liquid pool is considered to add little to 
the overall hazard and is ignored. 
The event tree includes the pressure effects of the tanker failure.  In the UK, this hazard 
is not considered to contribute significantly to the offsite risks and is ignored. 
 
Road tanker hole dimensions 
HSE uses a set of standard hole sizes for chlorine pressure vessels (50mm, 25mm, 
13mm and 6mm) with associated failure frequencies.  The holes are apportioned 
between the liquid and vapour space and internal HSE guidance suggests that the ratio 
in this case is 50:50.  Consequently, half of the holes are in lower part of the tanker and 
release liquid for the entire duration of the release and half are in the upper part of the 
tanker and release vapour. 
The flow rates are determined using the HSE code STREAM.  The duration of release is 
30 minutes or the time to release half of the tanker contents (i.e. 9000 kg).  
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Failure of tanker offloading pipe (pre-ROSOV) 
There is either a short section of pipe from the tanker to the first remotely operated 
shut-off valve (termed ROSOV in the UK or ROV in the case study at Appendix 2) or 
there is the chance that the ROSOV may be struck from the tanker (passing vehicle, 
etc.).  It is assumed in the case study description that the internal tanker pump will limit 
the flow from the tanker to 3 kg/s.   
The chlorine is transferred through a connection in the vessel vapour space.  At the time 
of failure, there will be vapour backflow from the storage vessel (1.9 kg/s based on 
STREAM (5.87 bara pressure and 23m of 50mm pipe)).  The forward flow is assumed to 
last for 30 minutes with the back flow limited to 20 minutes.  The total combined flow is 
averaged over 30 minutes in the following way: 
Average flow for 30 minutes = [(3 x 1800) + (1.9 x 1200)]/1800 = 4.3 kg/s  
The failure rate is based on the 25mm vessel hole rather than a pipe failure  since failure 
is likely to be caused by vehicle impact, etc. rather than normal pipework failures. 
 
Scenario Tree 2. Unloading Hose (Event tree “Scenario for chlorine 
loading/unloading”) 
The offloading system is assumed to be “average” in terms of failure likelihood and there 
are 150 delivery operations per year.  The tanker ROSOV is assumed to close in 5 
minutes (i.e. time for gas detection to detect the release, the operator to react to the 
alarm and the closure mechanism to operate) when it works and has a failure probability 
of 0.03 failures per demand.  Scenarios were developed for both ROSOV working (closing 
on demand) and failing (not closing on demand). 
For relatively short lengths of pipework, it is assumed that the failure occurs half way 
along the hose (to give average flow conditions) and that the maximum forward flow is 
limited by the tanker pump to 3 kg/s.  The vapour backflow is recalculated with the 
same source conditions as above but a shorter length of pipework (i.e. 18m of transfer 
line plus 2.5m of loading hose). The recalculated backflow is 2.0 kg/s. 
HSE assumes a standard set of failures (guillotine failure, 15mm hole and 5mm hole).  
STREAM was set to give 3 kg/s through the guillotine failure (pump limited) and the 
flows for the holes determined accordingly.  For the holes, it is assumed that the 
backflow would be prevented by the forward flow or not contribute significantly to the 
hazard.  
The combined flow for the guillotine failures is averaged over 20 minutes when the 
ROSOV works (i.e. the back flow duration) and 30 minutes when it fails, using the same 
logic as in 2.1 above.  For the holes, the durations are 5 minutes (ROSOV works) and 30 
minutes (ROSOV fails). 
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Scenario Tree 3.   Transfer Line (Event tree “Scenario for chlorine 
loading/unloading”) 
As in Scenario Tree 2, the tanker ROSOV is assumed to close in 5 minutes when it works 
and has a failure probability of 0.03 failures per demand.  Again, scenarios were 
developed for both ROSOV working and failing. 
It is assumed that the failure occurs half way along the transfer line (9m from the 
vessel) to give average flow conditions and that the maximum forward flow is limited by 
the tanker pump to 3 kg/s.  The vapour backflow is recalculated as 2.6 kg/s. 
HSE assumes a standard set of failures (guillotine failure, 25mm hole and 3mm hole).  
STREAM was set to give 3 kg/s through the guillotine failure (pump limited) and the 
flows for the holes determined accordingly.  For the holes, it is assumed that the 
backflow would be prevented by the forward flow or not contribute significantly to the 
hazard. 
Again, the combined flow for the guillotine failures is averaged over 20 minutes when 
the ROSOV works (i.e. the back flow duration) and 30 minutes when it fails.  For the 
holes, the durations are 5 minutes (ROSOV works) and 30 minutes (ROSOV fails). 
 
Scenario Tree 4. Storage Vessels (Event tree “Scenario for chlorine 
storage tank”) 
It is assumed that there are 2 vessels each with an inventory of 60,000 kg.  This is a 
simplifying assumption since the actual inventory in each vessel will cycle between 
80,000 kg and a minimum, pre-filling inventory (say 10,000 kg). 
Catastrophic Failure 
For catastrophic failure, HSE assumes that 50% of the events eject the entire inventory 
into the cloud (“upward release”) with the remaining 50% (“downward release”) ejecting 
half of the inventory into the cloud and half into a liquid pool on the ground.  The 
evaporation from the liquid pool is considered to add little to the overall hazard and is 
ignored. 
Vessel hole dimensions 
HSE has a set of standard hole sizes for chlorine pressure vessels (50mm, 25mm, 13mm 
and 6mm) with associated failure frequencies.  The holes are apportioned between the 
liquid and vapour space and internal HSE guidance suggests that the ratio in this case is 
50:50 since the vessels are not bunded. Consequently, half of the holes are in lower part 
of the vessel and release liquid for the entire duration of the release and half are in the 
upper part of the vessel and release vapour. 
The flow rates are determined using the HSE code STREAM.  The duration of release is 
30 minutes or the time to release half of the tanker contents (i.e. 30,000 kg).  
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Failure of feed line (pre-ROSOV) 
There is a short section of pipe from the vessel to the second ROSOV.  It is assumed in 
the case study description that the vessel excess flow valve (termed XSFV in the UK or 
EFV in the case study at Appendix 2) will limit the flow from the vessel to 3 kg/s.  
Scenarios were developed for both XSFV working (1 minute flow of 3 kg/s) and failing to 
restrict the flow (giving 4.8 kg/s for 30 minutes). 
The failure rate is based on guillotine failure of 0.5m of 25mm diameter pipe. 
 
Scenario Tree 5. Feed Line (Event tree “Scenario for chlorine pipework”) 
In the case study description, it is assumed that the feed line is only in use 10% of the 
time. 
 
Pipework Failure 
It is assumed that the failure occurs half way along the transfer line (25m from the 
vessel) to give average flow conditions and that the maximum forward flow is limited by 
the vessel XSFV to 3 kg/s when it works.   
HSE assumes a standard set of failures (guillotine failure, 25mm hole and 3mm hole).  
STREAM was used to determine the flow through the guillotine failure in the absence of 
restriction (i.e. no XSFV) and this was found to be 2.3 kg/s.  Consequently, the XSFV 
would have no impact on the assessment in this simplified case (i.e. single failure at 
25m).  The flows for the holes were determined using the pipe split model in STREAM.   
The vessel ROSOV is assumed to close in 5 minutes when it works (i.e. shuts off the 
flow) and has a failure probability of 0.03 failures per demand.  Scenarios were 
developed for both ROSOV working (closing on demand) and failing (not closing on 
demand). 
From the case study description, there is no backflow from the reactor. 
 
Flange Failure 
The feed line has 6 flanges.  HSE has standard failure rates for flanges and assumes that 
the failure is represented by the ejection of the gasket between 2 bolts.  For a 25mm 
line with “4 bolt” flanges this is ¼ of the circumference and (assuming a 3.2mm thick 
gasket) gives a flow area equivalent to an 8mm hole. 
 
Again, scenarios were developed for both ROSOV working and failing. 
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Risk Assessment 
Individual Risk 
Individual risks around the hypothetical site were determined using the scenarios in 
Table 1 and the HSE risk assessment tool RISKAT.  Two assessments were carried out; 
one for the tanker offloading where the probability of F2.4 weather was set to 0 
(daytime only operation) and one for the vessel and feed line releases using the full 
weather set (24 hour operations).  The risk contours (10, 1 and 0.3 cpm of Dangerous 
Dose) from the 2 assessments were combined and the overall risk is given in Figure 1a. 
A number of scenarios in Table 1 were excluded from the risk assessment on the 
grounds of low frequency.  These are indicated in the last column of Table 1 by a “Y”. 
From Figure 1a, it can be seen that the following zone limits can be determined for this 
hypothetical plant: 
Inner Zone   = 310m max. 
Middle Zone   = 800m max. 
Outer Zone/CD  = 1570m max. 
 
Societal Risk 
Societal risks were determined using the internal HSE model QuickFN which is based on 
work carried out for HSE by ERM (see research report RR283 on HSE’s website).  All the 
events in Table 1 were included in the assessment. 
QuickFN is limited to 2 weather conditions; D5 and F2.  HSE has data files for such 
weather (.w2 files) but they are derived differently to the weather used in the individual 
risk assessment (termed .WEA files).  For this assessment, the W2 directional 
probabilities were used with the F2 probability set to 0 for offloading events (D5 set to 1 
- F2, i.e. 1 – 0.17 = 0.83).   
The results are presented at Figure 1b.  As tanker offloading was assumed to take place 
during the day, 2 separate FN curves were produced to cover: 
• offloading operations (F2 probability set to 0); and  
• normal activities.   
It can be seen that the combined FN curve lies mostly within the lower part of the HSE 
“Tolerable if ALARP” region. 
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Conclusions 
The generic RHAD event trees have been applied to the hypothetical chlorine site and a 
set of 43 scenarios generated.  This included events where the ROSOVs and XSFV 
worked or failed. 
The most significant events (based on frequency) were used to generate individual risk 
contours using the HSE model RISKAT.  These contours are of a typical size for such 
major hazards facilities. 
The events were also used to generate societal risk FN curves using the HSE model 
QuickFN.  These show societal risks which are relatively low but this is a reflection of the 
absence of major population centres around the hypothetical site. 
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Table 15  Case Study Scenarios 
Event Flow Duration 
Base  
frequency Multipliers 
Event 
frequency Comments 
Excluded  
from RA 
2.1 Road Tanker Events 
Tanker catastrophic failure 
18000 
kg Inst. 2.00E-06 0.5 x 0.05 5.00E-08 
50% upwards with 100% into 
cloud, present for 150 x 3 hours 
per year, pressure effects ignored 
Y 
Tanker catastrophic failure 9000 kg Inst. 2.00E-06 0.5 x 0.05 5.00E-08 
50% downwards with 50% into 
cloud, present for 150 x 3 hours 
per year, pressure effects ignored 
Y 
Tanker 50mm hole (liquid) 
26.4 
kg/s 5.7 min 5.00E-06 0.5 x 0.05 1.25E-07 
50% holes in liquid space, present 
for 150 x 3 hours per year 
 
Tanker 25mm hole (liquid) 6.2 kg/s 24.2 min 5.00E-06 0.5 x 0.05 1.25E-07 
50% holes in liquid space, present 
for 150 x 3 hours per year 
 
Tanker 13mm hole (liquid) 1.6 kg/s 30 min 1.00E-05 0.5 x 0.05 2.50E-07 
50% holes in liquid space, present 
for 150 x 3 hours per year 
 
Tanker 6mm hole (liquid) 
0.25 
kg/s 30 min 4.00E-05 0.5 x 0.05 1.00E-06 
50% holes in liquid space, present 
for 150 x 3 hours per year 
 
Tanker 50mm hole (vapour) 4.4 kg/s 30 min 5.00E-06 0.5 x 0.05 1.25E-07 
50% holes in vapour space, 
present for 150 x 3 hours per year 
 
Tanker 25mm hole (vapour) 1.1 kg/s 30 min 5.00E-06 0.5 x 0.05 1.25E-07 
50% holes in vapour space, 
present for 150 x 3 hours per year 
 
Tanker 13mm hole (vapour) 0.3 kg/s 30 min 1.00E-05 0.5 x 0.05 2.50E-07 
50% holes in vapour space, 
present for 150 x 3 hours per year 
 
Tanker 6mm hole (vapour) 
0.06 
kg/s 30 min 4.00E-05 0.5 x 0.05 1.00E-06 
50% holes in vapour space, 
present for 150 x 3 hours per year 
 
Tanker offloading pipe 
failure (pre ROSOV) 4.3 kg/s 30 min 5.00E-06 0.05 2.50E-07 
Guillotine failure plus vapour 
backflow from tank, frequency 
based on 25mm tank hole and 
tanker presence 
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2.2 Unloading Hose        
Loading hose guillotine 
failure  
(ROSOV works) 2.8 kg/s 20 min 4.00E-06 150 x 0.97 5.82E-04 
Combined flow averaged over 20 
min, 150 deliveries 
 
Loading hose guillotine 
failure  
(ROSOV fails) 4.3 kg/s 30 min 4.00E-06 150 x 0.03 1.80E-05 
Combined flow averaged over 30 
min, 150 deliveries 
 
Loading hose 15mm hole  
(ROSOV works) 
1.06 
kg/s 5 min 4.00E-07 150 x 0.97 5.82E-05 
Forward flow only for 5 min, 150 
deliveries 
 
Loading hose 15mm hole  
(ROSOV fails) 
1.06 
kg/s 30 min 4.00E-07 150 x 0.03 1.80E-06 
Forward flow only for 30 min, 150 
deliveries 
 
Loading hose 5mm hole  
(ROSOV works) 0.2 kg/s 5 min 6.00E-06 150 x 0.97 8.73E-04 
Forward flow only for 5 min, 150 
deliveries 
 
Loading hose 5mm hole  
(ROSOV fails) 0.2 kg/s 30 min 6.00E-06 150 x 0.03 2.70E-05 
Forward flow only for 30 min, 150 
deliveries 
 
2.3 Transfer Line        
Transfer line guillotine 
failure  
(ROSOV works) 3.2 kg/s 20 min 5.00E-07 
18 x 0.97 x 
0.05 4.37E-07 
Combined flow averaged over 20 
min, present for 150 x 3 hours per 
year 
 
Transfer line guillotine 
failure  
(ROSOV fails) 4.0 kg/s 30 min 5.00E-07 
18 x 0.03 x 
0.05 1.35E-08 
Combined flow averaged over 30 
min, present for 150 x 3 hours per 
year 
Y 
Transfer line 25mm hole  
(ROSOV works) 2.3 kg/s 5 min 1.00E-06 
18 x 0.97 x 
0.05 8.73E-07 
Forward flow only for 5 min, 
present for 150 x 3 hours per year 
 
Transfer line 25mm hole  
(ROSOV fails) 2.3 kg/s 30 min 1.00E-06 
18 x 0.03 x 
0.05 2.70E-08 
Forward flow only for 30 min, 
present for 150 x 3 hours per year 
Y 
Transfer line 3mm hole  
(ROSOV works) 
0.06 
kg/s 5 min 2.00E-06 
18 x 0.97 x 
0.05 1.75E-06 
Forward flow only for 5 min, 
present for 150 x 3 hours per year 
 
Transfer line 3mm hole  
(ROSOV fails) 
0.06 
kg/s 30 min 2.00E-06 
18 x 0.03 x 
0.05 5.40E-08 
Forward flow only for 30 min, 
present for 150 x 3 hours per year 
Y 
2.4 Storage Vessels        
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Vessel catastrophic failure 
60000 
kg Inst. 2.00E-06 2 x 0.5 2.00E-06 
50% upwards with 100% into 
cloud 
 
Vessel catastrophic failure 
30000 
kg Inst. 2.00E-06 2 x 0.5 2.00E-06 
50% downwards with 50% into 
cloud 
 
Vessel 50mm hole (liquid) 
20.3 
kg/s 24.6 min 5.00E-06 2 x 0.5 5.00E-06 50% holes in liquid space 
 
Vessel 25mm hole (liquid) 4.8 kg/s 30 min 5.00E-06 2 x 0.5 5.00E-06 50% holes in liquid space  
Vessel 13mm hole (liquid) 1.2 kg/s 30 min 1.00E-05 2 x 0.5 1.00E-05 50% holes in liquid space  
Vessel 6mm hole (liquid) 
0.24 
kg/s 30 min 4.00E-05 2 x 0.5 4.00E-05 50% holes in liquid space 
 
Vessel 50mm hole (vapour) 3.8 kg/s 30 min 5.00E-06 2 x 0.5 5.00E-06 50% holes in vapour space  
Vessel 25mm hole (vapour) 
0.94 
kg/s 30 min 5.00E-06 2 x 0.5 5.00E-06 50% holes in vapour space 
 
Vessel 13mm hole (vapour) 
0.25 
kg/s 30 min 1.00E-05 2 x 0.5 1.00E-05 50% holes in vapour space 
 
Vessel 6mm hole (vapour) 
0.05 
kg/s 30 min 4.00E-05 2 x 0.5 4.00E-05 50% holes in vapour space 
 
Outlet pipe fails (XSFV 
works) 3 kg/s 1 min 1.00E-06 
2 x 0.5 x 
0.987 9.87E-07 
XSFV limits flow to 3 kg/s, 0.5m 
length of pipe 
 
Outlet pipe fails (XSFV fails) 4.8 kg/s 30 min 1.00E-06 
2 x 0.5 x 
0.013 1.30E-08 
Flow equivalent to 25 mm hole in 
vessel, 0.5m length of pipe 
Y 
2.5 Feed Line        
Feed line Guillotine failure  
(ROSOV works) 2.3 kg/s 5 min 1.00E-06 
50 x 0.97 x 
0.1 4.85E-06 50m line, only used 10% of time 
 
Feed line Guillotine failure  
(ROSOV fails) 2.3 kg/s 30 min 1.00E-06 
50 x 0.03 x 
0.1 1.50E-07 50m line, only used 10% of time 
 
Feed line 25mm hole  
(XSFV works, ROSOV works) 1.8 kg/s 5 min 5.00E-06 
50 x 0.97 x 
0.1 2.43E-05 50m line, only used 10% of time 
 
Feed line 25mm hole  
(XSFV works, ROSOV fails) 1.8 kg/s 30 min 5.00E-06 
50 x 0.03 x 
0.1 7.50E-07 50m line, only used 10% of time 
 
Feed line 3mm hole  
(XSFV works, ROSOV works) 
0.06 
kg/s 5 min 1.00E-05 
50 x 0.97 x 
0.1 4.85E-05 50m line, only used 10% of time 
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Feed line 3mm hole  
(XSFV works, ROSOV fails) 
0.06 
kg/s 30 min 1.00E-05 
50 x 0.03 x 
0.1 1.50E-06 50m line, only used 10% of time 
 
Feed line flange leak  
(ROSOV works) 0.3 kg/s 5 min 5.00E-06 6 x 0.97 x 0.1 2.91E-06 6 flanges, only used 10% of time 
 
Feed line flange leak  
(ROSOV fails) 0.3 kg/s 30 min 5.00E-06 6 x 0.03 x 0.1 9.00E-08 6 flanges, only used 10% of time 
Y 
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Figure  Case Study Individual Risk Contours  
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Figure   Case Study Societal Risk FN Curves 
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Annex II: Assessment of the LPG Depot LUP case by one 
Member State: The Netherlands (RIVM) 
 
Part I: Describing the initiating event(s) 
In this section describe all of the possible initiating events that you consider in your 
analysis.   
 
1.  Describe the initiating event(s) that lead to the Critical Event(s) 
In Dutch QRA generic frequencies are used for all critical events. Generally, when deriving 
generic frequencies, all relevent causes are taken into account. 
 
2.  Specify the involved equipments and/or instruments and provide a short description of 
the possible causes that initiated the events 
Equipment 
 
Component 
 
Causes 
(e.g. corrosion, erosion, human failure, etc) 
rail tanker  Generic 
unloading arm  Generic 
transfer line  Generic 
storage vessel  Generic 
loading arm  Generic 
road tanker  Generic 
   
   
 
3.  Please add notes if you deem necessary to do so. 
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Part II: Identifying all possible failures 
Pressurised Storage Tank 
In this section describe all of the possible failures for the pressurised storage tank in your 
analysis.  
 
4.  Describe the failures for the pressurised storage tank 
Equipment Type of failure 
Failure 
frequency 
Source 
Pressurised storage tank 
Catastrophic 
failure - 
instantaneous 
release 
5E-7 y-1 
Reference Manual Bevi 
Risk Assessments, 
version 3.2, RIVM, 1 
July 2009 
Catastrophic 
failure -release 
in 10 minutes 
5E-7 y-1 
Reference Manual Bevi 
Risk Assessments, 
version 3.2, RIVM, 1 
July 2009 
10 mm hole 1E-5 y-1 
Reference Manual Bevi 
Risk Assessments, 
version 3.2, RIVM, 1 
July 2009 
 
5.  Please add notes if you deem necessary to do so. 
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Pipework 
In this section describe all of the possible failures for the pipework in your analysis.  
 
6.  Describe the failures for the pipework 
Equipment Type of failure 
Failure 
frequency 
Source 
Pipework 
Full bore 
rupture 
1E-6 m-1y-1 
(diameter <75 
mm); 
3E-7 m-1y-1 
(75 mm< 
diameter < 150 
mm); 
1E-7 m-1y-1 
(diameter >150 
mm) 
Reference Manual Bevi 
Risk Assessments, 
version 3.2, RIVM, 1 
July 2009 
Leak with an 
effective 
diameter of 
10% of the 
nominal  
diameter, up to 
a maximum of 
50 mm 
5E-6 m-1y-1  
(diameter < 75 
mm); 
2E-6 m-1y-1 
(75 mm < 
diameter < 150 
mm); 
5E-7 m-1y-1 
(diameter > 
150 mm) 
Reference Manual Bevi 
Risk Assessments, 
version 3.2, RIVM, 1 
July 2009 
 
7.  Please add notes if you deem necessary to do so. 
Frequencies mentioned are valid for an aboveground pipeline in process setting. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Loading/unloading hose 
In this section describe all of the possible failures for the loading/unloading hose in your 
analysis.  
 
8.  Describe the failures for the loading/unloading hose 
Equipment Type of failure 
Failure 
frequency 
Source 
Loading/unloading hose 
Full bore 
rupture 
4E-6 hr-1 
Reference Manual Bevi 
Risk Assessments, 
version 3.2, RIVM, 1 
July 2009 
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Leak 4E-5 hr-1 
Reference Manual Bevi 
Risk Assessments, 
version 3.2, RIVM, 1 
July 2009 
 
9.  Please add notes if you deem necessary to do so 
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Tankcar/wagon 
In this section describe all of the possible failures for the tankcar/wagon in your analysis.  
 
10.  Describe the failures for the Tankcar/wagon 
Equipment Type of failure 
Failure 
frequency 
Source 
Tankcar/wagon 
Catastrophic 
failure - 
instantaneous 
release 
5E-7 y-1 
Reference Manual Bevi 
Risk Assessments, 
version 3.2, RIVM, 1 
July 2009 
Release of 
entire contents 
from the largest 
connection 
5E-7 y-1 
Reference Manual Bevi 
Risk Assessments, 
version 3.2, RIVM, 1 
July 2009 
 
11.  Please add notes if you deem necessary to do so. 
Frequencies mentioned are valid for a road tanker with a pressurised tank. 
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Additional equipment 
In this section describe all of the possible failures for the additional equipments that are 
addressed in your analysis.  
 
12.  Describe the failures for the given additional equipment(s) 
Equipment Type of failure 
Failure 
frequency 
Source 
pump (canned, without 
gasket) 
Catastrophic 
failure 
1E-5 y-1 
Reference Manual Bevi 
Risk Assessments, 
version 3.2, RIVM, 1 
July 2009 
Leak (10 % 
diameter) 
5E-5 y-1 
Reference Manual Bevi 
Risk Assessments, 
version 3.2, RIVM, 1 
July 2009 
ESDV 
ESDV does not 
close 
1E-3 per 
operation 
Reference Manual Bevi 
Risk Assessments, 
version 3.2, RIVM, 1 
July 2009 
 
13.  Please add notes if you deem necessary to do so. 
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Part III: Identifying all possible critical events (CE) 
Pressurised storage tank 
In this section describe the possible Critical Events that are addressed in your analysis.  
 
14.  Describe the Critical Event(s) 
Equipment Critical Event 
Pressurised storage tank 
Catastrophic failure - instantaneous release 
Catastrophic failure -release in 10 minutes 
leak from a 10 mm hole 
 
15.  Please add notes if you deem necessary to do so. 
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Pipework 
In this section describe the possible Critical Events that are addressed in your analysis.  
 
16.  Describe the Critical Event(s) 
Equipment Critical Event 
Pipework 
Full bore rupture 
Leak with an effective diameter of 10% of the nominal  
diameter, up to a maximum of 50 mm 
 
17.  Please add notes if you deem necessary to do so. 
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Loading/unloading hose 
In this section describe the possible Critical Events that are addressed in your analysis.  
 
18.  Describe the Critical Event(s) 
Equipment Critical Event 
Loading/unloading hose 
Full bore rupture 
Leak with an effective diameter of 10% of the nominal  
diameter 
 
 
 
Tankcar/wagon 
In this section describe the possible Critical Events that are addressed in your analysis.  
 
20.  Describe the Critical Event(s) 
Equipment Critical Event 
Tankcar/wagon 
Catastrophic failure - instantaneous release 
Release of entire contents from the largest connection 
 
 
 
19.  Please add notes if you deem necessary to do so. 
 
21.  Please add notes if you deem necessary to do so. 
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Part III: Selection of the critical event(s) 
Pressurised Storage Tank 
24.  Describe the selected Critical Events for the pressurised storage tank. 
CE CE frequency 
  
  
  
  
  
 
25.  Please add notes if you deem necessary to do so. 
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Pipework 
26.  Describe the selected Critical Events for the pipework. 
CE CE frequency 
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
27.  Please add notes if you deem necessary to do so. 
 
 
 
 
 
 92 
 
Loading/Unloading hose 
28.  Describe the selected Critical Events for the loading/unloading hose. 
CE CE frequency 
  
  
  
  
  
 
29.  Please add notes if you deem necessary to do so. 
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Tankcar/wagon 
30.  Describe the selected Critical Events for the tankcar/wagon. 
CE CE frequency 
  
  
  
  
  
 
31.  Please add notes if you deem necessary to do so. 
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Additional equipment 
Insert any further equipment that you consider in your analysis and which was not listed 
before (please insert as many sheets as you need). 
32.  Describe the selected Critical Events for the additional equipments. 
Equipment CE CE frequency 
 
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
33.  Please add notes if you deem necessary to do so. 
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Part IV: Describing the dangerous phenomena 
Pressurised storage tank  
In this section describe all of the possible dangerous phenomena taken into consideration 
in relation to the Critical Event. 
34.  Describe the dangerous phenomena 
Critical Event 
Dangerous phenomena 
(please insert more rows if you need) 
Frequency of 
the dangerous 
pheomena 
Propane | Catastrophic 
rupture Flash fire 4.2E-07 
Propane | Catastrophic 
rupture Explosion 2.8E-07 
Propane | Catastrophic 
rupture Flash fire 1.8E-07 
Propane | Catastrophic 
rupture Vapour cloud explosion 1.2E-07 
Propane | Ten minute 
release Jet Fire 7.0E-07 
Propane | Ten minute 
release Flash fire 1.8E-07 
Propane | Ten minute 
release Vapour cloud explosion 1.2E-07 
Propane | 10 mm leak Jet Fire 4.0E-06 
Propane | 10 mm leak Flash fire 9.6E-06 
Propane | 10 mm leak Vapour cloud explosion 6.4E-06 
Propane | Pressure 
relief valve Jet Fire 2.0E-05 
Propane | Pressure 
relief valve Flash fire 1.2E-05 
Propane | Pressure 
relief valve Vapour cloud explosion 8.0E-06 
Butane | Catastrophic 
rupture Flash fire 2.1E-07 
Butane | Catastrophic 
rupture Explosion 1.4E-07 
Butane | Catastrophic 
rupture Flash fire 9.0E-08 
Butane | Catastrophic 
rupture Vapour cloud explosion 6.0E-08 
Butane | Ten minute 
release Jet Fire 3.5E-07 
Butane | Ten minute 
release Flash fire 9.0E-08 
Butane | Ten minute 
release Vapour cloud explosion 6.0E-08 
Butane | 10 mm leak Jet Fire 2.0E-06 
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Butane | 10 mm leak Flash fire 4.8E-06 
Butane | 10 mm leak Vapour cloud explosion 3.2E-06 
Butane | Pressure relief 
valve Jet Fire 1.0E-05 
Butane | Pressure relief 
valve Flash fire 6.0E-06 
Butane | Pressure relief 
valve Vapour cloud explosion 4.0E-06 
35.  Please add notes if you deem necessary to do so  
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Pipework 
In this section describe all of the possible dangerous phenomena taken into consideration 
in relation to the Critical Event. 
36.  Describe the dangerous phenomena 
Critical Event 
Dangerous 
phenomena 
(please insert 
more rows if you 
need) 
Frequency of 
the dangerous 
phenomena 
Transfer line   
Propane | Rupture of the transfer line | both 
ESDVs close Jet Fire 9.1E-07 
Propane | Rupture of the transfer line | both 
ESDVs close Flash fire 5.4E-07 
Propane | Rupture of the transfer line | both 
ESDVs close 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 3.6E-07 
Propane | Rupture of the transfer line | one or two 
ESDVs fail Jet Fire 1.8E-08 
Propane | Rupture of the transfer line | one or two 
ESDVs fail Flash fire 1.1E-08 
Propane | Rupture of the transfer line | one or two 
ESDVs fail 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 7.4E-09 
Propane | Rupture of the transfer line | safety 
valve fails Jet Fire 8.1E-08 
Propane | Rupture of the transfer line | safety 
valve fails Flash fire 4.8E-08 
Propane | Rupture of the transfer line | safety 
valve fails 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 3.2E-08 
Propane | Leak from the transfer line | both ESDVs 
close Jet Fire 1.8E-06 
Propane | Leak from the transfer line | both ESDVs 
close Flash fire 4.4E-06 
Propane | Leak from the transfer line | both ESDVs 
close 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 2.9E-06 
Propane | Leak from the transfer line | one or two 
ESDVs fail Jet Fire 3.7E-08 
Propane | Leak from the transfer line | one or two 
ESDVs fail Flash fire 8.8E-08 
Propane | Leak from the transfer line | one or two 
ESDVs fail 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 5.9E-08 
Butane | Rupture of the transfer line | both ESDVs 
close Jet Fire 8.4E-08 
Butane | Rupture of the transfer line | both ESDVs 
close Flash fire 5.0E-08 
Butane | Rupture of the transfer line | both ESDVs 
close 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 3.4E-08 
Butane | Rupture of the transfer line | one or two 
ESDVs fail Jet Fire 1.7E-09 
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Butane | Rupture of the transfer line | one or two 
ESDVs fail Flash fire 1.0E-09 
Butane | Rupture of the transfer line | one or two 
ESDVs fail 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 6.8E-10 
Butane | Rupture of the transfer line | safety valve 
fails Jet Fire 8.9E-08 
Butane | Rupture of the transfer line | safety valve 
fails Flash fire 5.3E-08 
Butane | Rupture of the transfer line | safety valve 
fails 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 3.6E-08 
Butane | Leak from the transfer line | both ESDVs 
close Jet Fire 1.7E-07 
Butane | Leak from the transfer line | both ESDVs 
close Flash fire 4.0E-07 
Butane | Leak from the transfer line | both ESDVs 
close 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 2.7E-07 
Butane | Leak from the transfer line | one or two 
ESDVs fail Jet Fire 3.4E-09 
Butane | Leak from the transfer line | one or two 
ESDVs fail Flash fire 8.2E-09 
Butane | Leak from the transfer line | one or two 
ESDVs fail 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 5.5E-09 
   
Vapour return line   
Propane | Rupture of the vapour return line | ESDV 
closes Jet Fire 4.6E-07 
Propane | Rupture of the vapour return line | ESDV 
closes Flash fire 2.8E-07 
Propane | Rupture of the vapour return line | ESDV 
closes 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 1.9E-07 
Propane | Rupture of the vapour return line | ESDV 
fails Jet Fire 4.6E-10 
Propane | Rupture of the vapour return line | ESDV 
fails Flash fire 2.8E-10 
Propane | Rupture of the vapour return line | ESDV 
fails 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 1.9E-10 
Propane | Leak from the vapour return line | ESDV 
closes Jet Fire 1.2E-06 
Propane | Leak from the vapour return line | ESDV 
closes Flash fire 3.0E-06 
Propane | Leak from the vapour return line | ESDV 
closes 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 2.0E-06 
Propane | Leak from the vapour return line | ESDV 
fails Jet Fire 1.2E-09 
Propane | Leak from the vapour return line | ESDV 
fails Flash fire 3.0E-09 
Propane | Leak from the vapour return line | ESDV 
fails 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 2.0E-09 
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Butane | Rupture of the vapour return line | ESDV 
closes Jet Fire 4.5E-08 
Butane | Rupture of the vapour return line | ESDV 
closes Flash fire 2.7E-08 
Butane | Rupture of the vapour return line | ESDV 
closes 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 1.8E-08 
Butane | Rupture of the vapour return line | ESDV 
fails Jet Fire 4.5E-11 
Butane | Rupture of the vapour return line | ESDV 
fails Flash fire 2.7E-11 
Butane | Rupture of the vapour return line | ESDV 
fails 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 1.8E-11 
Butane | Leak from the vapour return line | ESDV 
closes Jet Fire 1.2E-07 
Butane | Leak from the vapour return line | ESDV 
closes Flash fire 2.9E-07 
Butane | Leak from the vapour return line | ESDV 
closes 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 1.9E-07 
Butane | Leak from the vapour return line | ESDV 
fails Jet Fire 1.2E-10 
Butane | Leak from the vapour return line | ESDV 
fails Flash fire 2.9E-10 
Butane | Leak from the vapour return line | ESDV 
fails 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 1.9E-10 
 
   
Feed line (before pump)   
Propane | Rupture of the transfer line | ESDV 
closes Jet Fire 1.3E-06 
Propane | Rupture of the transfer line | ESDV 
closes Flash fire 8.0E-07 
Propane | Rupture of the transfer line | ESDV 
closes 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 5.4E-07 
Propane | Rupture of the transfer line | ESDV fails Jet Fire 1.3E-09 
Propane | Rupture of the transfer line | ESDV fails Flash fire 8.1E-10 
Propane | Rupture of the transfer line | ESDV fails 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 5.4E-10 
Propane | Leak from the transfer line | ESDV 
closes Jet Fire 3.0E-06 
Propane | Leak from the transfer line | ESDV 
closes Flash fire 7.2E-06 
Propane | Leak from the transfer line | ESDV 
closes 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 4.8E-06 
Propane | Leak from the transfer line | ESDV fails Jet Fire 3.0E-09 
Propane | Leak from the transfer line | ESDV fails Flash fire 7.3E-09 
Propane | Leak from the transfer line | ESDV fails 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 4.8E-09 
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Butane | Rupture of the transfer line | ESDV closes Jet Fire 1.5E-07 
Butane | Rupture of the transfer line | ESDV closes Flash fire 8.9E-08 
Butane | Rupture of the transfer line | ESDV closes 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 6.0E-08 
Butane | Rupture of the transfer line | ESDV fails Jet Fire 1.5E-10 
Butane | Rupture of the transfer line | ESDV fails Flash fire 9.0E-11 
Butane | Rupture of the transfer line | ESDV fails 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 6.0E-11 
Butane | Leak from the transfer line | ESDV closes Jet Fire 3.4E-07 
Butane | Leak from the transfer line | ESDV closes Flash fire 8.0E-07 
Butane | Leak from the transfer line | ESDV closes 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 5.4E-07 
Butane | Leak from the transfer line | ESDV fails Jet Fire 3.4E-10 
Butane | Leak from the transfer line | ESDV fails Flash fire 8.1E-10 
Butane | Leak from the transfer line | ESDV fails 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 5.4E-10 
   
Feed line (after pump)   
Propane | Rupture of the transfer line | ESDV 
closes Jet Fire 7.5E-07 
Propane | Rupture of the transfer line | ESDV 
closes Flash fire 4.5E-07 
Propane | Rupture of the transfer line | ESDV 
closes 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 3.0E-07 
Propane | Rupture of the transfer line | ESDV fails Jet Fire 7.6E-10 
Propane | Rupture of the transfer line | ESDV fails Flash fire 4.5E-10 
Propane | Rupture of the transfer line | ESDV fails 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 3.0E-10 
Propane | Leak from the transfer line | ESDV 
closes Jet Fire 2.0E-06 
Propane | Leak from the transfer line | ESDV 
closes Flash fire 4.8E-06 
Propane | Leak from the transfer line | ESDV 
closes 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 3.2E-06 
Propane | Leak from the transfer line | ESDV fails Jet Fire 2.0E-09 
Propane | Leak from the transfer line | ESDV fails Flash fire 4.8E-09 
Propane | Leak from the transfer line | ESDV fails 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 3.2E-09 
Butane | Rupture of the transfer line | ESDV closes Jet Fire 8.4E-08 
Butane | Rupture of the transfer line | ESDV closes Flash fire 5.0E-08 
Butane | Rupture of the transfer line | ESDV closes 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 3.4E-08 
Butane | Rupture of the transfer line | ESDV fails Jet Fire 8.4E-11 
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Butane | Rupture of the transfer line | ESDV fails Flash fire 5.0E-11 
Butane | Rupture of the transfer line | ESDV fails 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 3.4E-11 
Butane | Leak from the transfer line | ESDV closes Jet Fire 2.2E-07 
Butane | Leak from the transfer line | ESDV closes Flash fire 5.4E-07 
Butane | Leak from the transfer line | ESDV closes 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 3.6E-07 
Butane | Leak from the transfer line | ESDV fails Jet Fire 2.2E-10 
Butane | Leak from the transfer line | ESDV fails Flash fire 5.4E-10 
Butane | Leak from the transfer line | ESDV fails 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 3.6E-10 
 
37.  Please add notes if you deem necessary to do so  
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Loading/Unloading Hose 
In this section describe all of the possible dangerous phenomena taken into consideration 
in relation to the Critical Event. 
38.  Describe the dangerous phenomena 
Critical event 
Dangerous 
phenomena 
(please insert more 
rows if you need) 
Frequency of 
the dangerous 
phenomena 
Unloading arm 
Propane | Rupture of the unloading arm | both 
ESDVs close Jet Fire 1.8E-05 
Propane | Rupture of the unloading arm | both 
ESDVs close Flash fire 1.1E-05 
Propane | Rupture of the unloading arm | both 
ESDVs close 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 7.1E-06 
Propane | Rupture of the unloading arm | ESDV 
fails Jet Fire 3.6E-07 
Propane | Rupture of the unloading arm | ESDV 
fails Flash fire 2.1E-07 
Propane | Rupture of the unloading arm | ESDV 
fails 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 1.4E-07 
Propane | Leak from the unloading arm | both 
ESDVs close Jet Fire 7.1E-05 
Propane | Leak from the unloading arm | both 
ESDVs close Flash fire 1.7E-04 
Propane | Leak from the unloading arm | both 
ESDVs close 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 1.1E-04 
Propane | Leak from the unloading arm | one or 
two ESDVs fail Jet Fire 1.4E-06 
Propane | Leak from the unloading arm | one or 
two ESDVs fail Flash fire 3.4E-06 
Propane | Leak from the unloading arm | one or 
two ESDVs fail 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 2.3E-06 
Butane | Rupture of the unloading arm | both 
ESDVs close Jet Fire 1.7E-06 
Butane | Rupture of the unloading arm | both 
ESDVs close Flash fire 1.0E-06 
Butane | Rupture of the unloading arm | both 
ESDVs close 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 6.9E-07 
Butane | Rupture of the unloading arm | one or 
two ESDVs fail Jet Fire 3.5E-08 
Butane | Rupture of the unloading arm | one or 
two ESDVs fail Flash fire 2.1E-08 
Butane | Rupture of the unloading arm | one or 
two ESDVs fail 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 1.4E-08 
Butane | Leak from the unloading arm | both 
ESDVs close Jet Fire 6.9E-06 
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Butane | Leak from the unloading arm | both 
ESDVs close Flash fire 1.6E-05 
Butane | Leak from the unloading arm | both 
ESDVs close 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 1.1E-05 
Butane | Leak from the unloading arm | one or 
two ESDVs fail Jet Fire 1.4E-07 
Butane | Leak from the unloading arm | one or 
two ESDVs fail Flash fire 3.3E-07 
Butane | Leak from the unloading arm | one or 
two ESDVs fail 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 2.2E-07 
   
Loading arm   
Propane | Rupture of the loading arm | both 
ESDVs close Jet Fire 2.2E-05 
Propane | Rupture of the loading arm | both 
ESDVs close Flash fire 1.3E-05 
Propane | Rupture of the loading arm | both 
ESDVs close 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 8.8E-06 
Propane | Rupture of the loading arm | ESDV 
fails Jet Fire 4.5E-10 
Propane | Rupture of the loading arm | ESDV 
fails Flash fire 2.7E-10 
Propane | Rupture of the loading arm | ESDV 
fails 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 1.8E-10 
Propane | Leak from the loading arm | both 
ESDVs close Jet Fire 8.8E-05 
Propane | Leak from the loading arm | both 
ESDVs close Flash fire 2.1E-04 
Propane | Leak from the loading arm | both 
ESDVs close 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 1.4E-04 
Propane | Leak from the loading arm | ESDV fails Jet Fire 1.8E-09 
Propane | Leak from the loading arm | ESDV fails Flash fire 4.3E-09 
Propane | Leak from the loading arm | ESDV fails 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 2.9E-09 
Butane | Rupture of the loading arm | both 
ESDVs close Jet Fire 2.4E-06 
Butane | Rupture of the loading arm | both 
ESDVs close Flash fire 1.5E-06 
Butane | Rupture of the loading arm | both 
ESDVs close 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 9.8E-07 
Butane | Rupture of the loading arm | ESDV fails Jet Fire 5.0E-11 
Butane | Rupture of the loading arm | ESDV fails Flash fire 3.0E-11 
Butane | Rupture of the loading arm | ESDV fails 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 2.0E-11 
Butane | Leak from the loading arm | both 
ESDVs close Jet Fire 9.8E-06 
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Butane | Leak from the loading arm | both 
ESDVs close Flash fire 2.3E-05 
Butane | Leak from the loading arm | both 
ESDVs close 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 1.6E-05 
Butane | Leak from the loading arm | ESDV fails Jet Fire 2.0E-10 
Butane | Leak from the loading arm | ESDV fails Flash fire 4.8E-10 
Butane | Leak from the loading arm | ESDV fails 
Vapour cloud 
explosion 3.2E-10 
 
39.  Please add notes if you deem necessary to do so  
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Tankcar/Wagon 
In this section describe all of the possible dangerous phenomena taken into consideration 
in relation to the Critical Event. 
40.  Describe the dangerous phenomena 
Critical event 
Dangerous phenomena 
(please insert more rows if you 
need) 
Frequency of 
the dangerous 
phenomena 
Rail tanker   
Propane | Catastrophic rupture Fireball 5.5E-08 
Propane | Catastrophic rupture Flash fire 8.2E-09 
Propane | Catastrophic rupture Vapour cloud explosion 5.5E-09 
Propane | Release from largest 
connection Jet Fire 6.8E-09 
Propane | Release from largest 
connection Flash fire 3.7E-08 
Propane | Release from largest 
connection Vapour cloud explosion 2.5E-08 
Propane | Fire impingement BLEVE 1.4E-07 
Butane | Catastrophic rupture Fireball 5.3E-09 
Butane | Catastrophic rupture Flash fire 8.0E-10 
Butane | Catastrophic rupture Vapour cloud explosion 5.3E-10 
Butane | Release from largest 
connection Jet Fire 6.7E-10 
Butane | Release from largest 
connection Flash fire 3.6E-09 
Butane | Release from largest 
connection Vapour cloud explosion 2.4E-09 
Butane | Fire impingement BLEVE 1.3E-08 
   
Road tanker   
Propane | Catastrophic rupture Fireball 5.6E-05 
Propane | Catastrophic rupture Flash fire 8.4E-06 
Propane | Catastrophic rupture Vapour cloud explosion 5.6E-06 
Propane | Release from largest 
connection Jet Fire 7.0E-06 
Propane | Release from largest 
connection Flash fire 3.8E-05 
Propane | Release from largest 
connection Vapour cloud explosion 2.5E-05 
Propane | Fire impingement BLEVE 1.4E-06 
41.  Please add notes if you deem necessary to do so  
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Part V: Impact criteria 
1.  Risk based approach 
42.  Provide the criteria upon which you base your decision. 
Individual risk 
Exposure 
time 
Criteria for fatality Criteria for injury Probit 
flammables 
minimum of fire 
duration and 20 s 
irrelevant 
 
    
    
    
    
 
43.  Insert the iso-risk curves here or enclose it to the template. 
 
 
44.  Describe the land use decision criteria based upon the risk contours.  
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No vulnerable objects are allowed within IR 10-6 contour. Vulnerable objects include 
dwellings (with a density of 2 per ha or more), schools, hospitals and other objects where 
many persons are present (sufficiently large offices, recreational and sport facilities, and 
so on). 
 
The presence of objects of limited vulnerability within IR 10-6 is highly undesirable. 
Objects of limited vulnerability include isolated dwellings (density less than 2 per ha), 
neighbouring industries with similar activities, small shops, and so on. 
 
45.  Societal risk 
The height of the societal risk should be accounted for by the competent authority. 
Guidance values are defined for reference. 
 
46.  Insert the F-N curve here or enclose it to the template. 
 
 
47.  Please add notes if you deem necessary to do so  
The competent authority must account for the height of the societal risk. 
No actions are carried out for existing activities and land-use. For new activities or new 
land-use developments, additional safety measures (technical and organisational) and 
alternative locations for the chlorine plant, or alternative locations for the offices, school 
and houses must be seriously considered as the guidance values for societal risk are 
exceeded. 
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Part VI: Mitigation of consequences 
Safety barriers 
Provide information about safety barriers which you have considered for mitigating the 
consequence.   
55.  Describe the safety barrier(s) and the conditions of its(their) unavailability 
Safety barrier Description Conditions of unavailability 
Remotely operated 
valve 
Automatic detection but 
manual handling 
 
probability of success 99% 
default duration of closure 600 s 
 
 
 
Emergency shut-
down valve (ESDV) 
and safety valve 
Automatic detection and 
automatic handling 
 
probability of success 99.9% 
default duration of closure 120 s 
 
 
 
 
56.  Please add notes if you deem necessary to do so  
 
 
 
 
 
9.1 Part VII: Final Land Use Decision 
In this section you should provide and justify your final decision regarding the location of 
the buildings as presented on the map. Also, for each of the building explain why these 
can or cannot be located in the current place and what you would do in case the building 
would not be allowed to be in that position.   
57.  Explain your final decisions regarding the location of the building. 
Location 
building 
Final 
decision 
(Yes/No) 
Explain your answer (in case of ‘no’ also explain what you would 
do with the building, e.g. remove house/factory, etc) 
A (school) Yes Outside IR 10-6 contour 
B (house) Yes Outside IR 10-6 contour 
C (house) Yes Outside IR 10-6 contour 
D (house) Yes Outside IR 10-6 contour 
E (house) Yes Outside IR 10-6 contour 
F (house) Yes Outside IR 10-6 contour 
G (house) Yes Outside IR 10-6 contour 
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H (house) Yes Outside IR 10-6 contour 
I (house) Yes 
Object I lies within the IR 10-6 contour. As the density of houses 
is less than 2 per ha in the current benchmark study, this house 
is regarded as an isolated house. Therefore, this is an object of 
limited vulnerability, not a vulnerable object. These objects are 
highly undesirable within the IR 10-6 contour, but not totally 
unacceptable. Efforts should be made to reduce risk or to buy-
out the owners (if public funding is available) 
J (office 
building) 
No 
This office lies within the IR 10-6 contour. As the number of 
persons is high, this objects is regarded as a vulnerable object 
and the presence within the 10-6 contour is unacceptable. 
Presuming the facility has a valid permit, the public authorities 
need to pay the buy-out or relocation of the office building. If 
this had been a request for a new permit or a change in the 
permit, the permit would not have been issued as the risk 
situation is unacceptable. 
K (office 
building) 
Yes Outside 10-6 risk contour 
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Annex III Identification of possible causes and safety 
barriers 
In this section a list of possible causes of failure and safety barriers are demonstrated. 
The purpose of the two lists are to give some examples and therefore they are not 
exclusive. All lists can be extended with additional examples.  
Example of possible causes relevant to the selected piece of equipment 
 
Detailed identification of causes of potential failures are usually done by different types of 
hazard analysis procedures like HAZOP, HAZID etc. analysis. Human error is also a 
possible cause of all discussed pieces of equipment, therefore it is not specified below. 
 
The selected types of equipment are as followings: 
Storage tank – above ground 
Pipework 
Pump/compressor 
Loading/unloading arm/hose 
Road tanker/rail tanker 
Carrier 
 
1. Storage tank – above ground 
Storage tanks are considered either pressurised or atmospheric tanks. Possible causes of 
storage tanks failure could be mechanical causes, like: 
design error, 
material and/or construction defect, 
mechanical malfunction, 
material fatigue, 
overfilling/overload, 
corrosion, 
embrittlement, 
under or overpressure. 
 
Other than the mechanical causes, also external impacts can cause failure of above 
ground storage tanks, like: 
extreme weather,  
natural disasters (flood, earthquakes, landslides etc.),  
domino effect. 
 
2. Pipework 
Possible causes of pipework failure could be mechanical causes, like: 
material defect, 
wrong installation, 
corrosion, 
erosion, 
vibration, 
embrittlement, 
overpressure. 
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Other than the mechanical causes, also external impacts can cause failure of pipework, 
like: 
extreme weather,  
natural disasters (flood, earthquakes, landslides etc.),  
domino effect. 
 
3. Pump/compressor 
Possible causes of pump/compressor failure could be mechanical causes, like: 
– material defect, 
overloading, 
– external impact, 
– corrosion, 
– erosion, 
– vibration, 
– embrittlement, 
overpressure, 
– more output than input caused underpressure, 
 
Other than the mechanical causes, also external impacts can cause failure of 
pump/compressor, like: 
– extreme weather,  
– natural disasters (flood, earthquakes, landslides etc.),  
– domino effect. 
 
4. Loading/unloading arm/hose   
Possible causes of loading/unloading arm/hose failure could be mechanical causes, like: 
design error, 
disconnect during load/unload, 
material and/or construction defect, 
mechanical malfunction, 
material fatigue, 
overfilling/overload, 
corrosion, 
embrittlement, 
under pressure. 
 
Other than the mechanical causes, also external impacts can cause failure of 
loading/unloading arm/hose, like: 
extreme weather,  
natural disasters (flood, earthquakes, landslides etc.),  
domino effect. 
 
5. Road tanker/rail tanker and carrier 
Failure of road or rail tankers and carriers are similar to the failures of storage tanks. 
Possible causes of road tanker/rail tanker and carrier failure could be mechanical causes, 
like: 
design error, 
material and/or construction defect, 
vibration, 
mechanical malfunction, 
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material fatigue, 
overfilling/overload, 
corrosion, 
embrittlement, 
under pressure. 
 
Other than the mechanical causes, also external impacts can cause failure of road 
tanker/rail tanker and carrier, like: 
extreme weather,  
natural disasters (flood, earthquakes, landslides etc.),  
domino effect. 
 
Example of identified safety barriers to the selected piece of equipment 
In this part non-exclusive lists of possible safety barriers are presented. These are 
examples for the selected types of equipment and there can be vary that are not on the 
lists below which could also be considered. (Source: Bologna report) 
 
1. Pressurised storage tank – above ground 
Pressure relief system  
Isolation (Emergency Shut Down) System  
Corrective actions on alarms for safety relevant parameters (level, pressure, 
temperature) 
Redundancy on level control/alarm  
Corrective actions on alarms for incident detection (flammable gas, fire and smoke) 
Firefighting system (water sprinklers, foam, dry chemical)  
Design and material for low temperature  
Design for vacuum  
Diversion wall and ground slope  
Protection against damage by vehicles (fence, crash barrier, etc.) 
Water draining  
 
2. Atmospheric storage tank – above ground 
Pressure relief valve 
Vacuum relief valve 
Inert gas paddling system  
Isolation (Emergency Shut Down) System  
Corrective actions on alarms for safety relevant parameters (level) 
Corrective actions on alarms for incident detection (flammable gas, fire and smoke) 
Firefighting system (water sprinklers, foam, dry chemical)  
Bund 
Water draining 
 
3. Pipework  
Pressure relief valve 
Isolation (Emergency Shut Down) System  
Corrective actions on alarms for incident detection (gas, flame detector) 
Firefighting system (foam, dry chemical)  
Thermal insulation  
Protection against vehicle impact  
Protection from external corrosion (paint, wrap, etc.) 
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4. Pump/compressor 
Blocking valve 
Non-returning valve 
Shut-off valve 
Excess flow valve 
Bunds 
Fire resisting coat 
Fire protection (water curtain) 
Gas/leak detection and stop flow 
 
5. Loading/unloading arm/hose; Road tanker/rail tanker and carrier 
Isolation (Emergency Shut Down) System  
Interlock system on vehicle movement  
Excess flow valve  
Corrective actions on alarms for safety relevant parameters (level, transferred quantity) 
Corrective actions on alarms for incident detection (gas, fire detector) 
Fire protection (water sprinklers)  
Ground slope and drainage  
Design for full containment (provides some protection from pressure and vacuum) 
Protection from static electricity  
Protection against vehicle impact  
Vessel, connection and equipment identification 
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